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The asset growth eect:
Insights from international equity markets
Abstract
Firms with higher asset growth rates subsequently experience lower stock returns in international
equity markets, consistent with the U.S. evidence. This negative eect of asset growth on returns
is stronger in more developed capital markets and markets where stocks are more eciently priced,
but is unrelated to country characteristics representing limits to arbitrage, investor protection, and
accounting quality. The evidence suggests that the cross-sectional relation between asset growth and
stock return is more likely due to an optimal investment eect than due to over-investment, market
timing, or other forms of mispricing.
JEL Classication: G12, G14, G15
keyword : asset growth eect, international stock markets
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1. Introduction
It has been documented that rms experiencing rapid growth by raising external nancing and mak-
ing capital investments subsequently have low stock returns, whereas rms experiencing contraction
via divestiture, share repurchase, and debt retirement enjoy high future returns.1 Cooper, Gulen,
and Schill (2008) summarize the synergistic eect of rms' investment and nancing activities by
creating a simple measure of total asset growth. They show that in the United States during the
period from 1968 to 2003, a value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the top asset-growth decile under-
performs the portfolio of stocks in the bottom decile by 13% per year, and such cross-sectional return
dierence cannot be explained by standard asset pricing models.
One of the most actively debated issues in the current nance literature is whether the negative
eect of investment and nancing on stock returns, as highlighted by the asset growth eect, is
evidence of market ineciency or can be viewed as a rational asset pricing result. From the behavioral
camp, several mispricing-based explanations have been proposed. These explanations include 1)
over-investment and empire-building tendency of corporate managers (e.g., Titman, Wei, and Xie,
2004), 2) capital structure market timing when raising and retiring external nancing (e.g., Baker
and Wurgler, 2002), 3) earnings management prior to nancing activities or acquisitions (e.g., Teoh,
Welch, and Wong, 1998a; 1998b), and 4) excessive extrapolation on past growth by investors when
they value rms (e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994).
From the rational asset pricing camp, the explanations center around the association between
investment and expected return, albeit with some variations. For example, Cochrane (1991, 1996)
and Liu, Whited, and Zhang (2009) study the discount rate eect of investments, i.e., rms making
large investments are likely to be those with low discount rates. In Lyandres, Sun, and Zhang (2008)
and Li, Livdan, and Zhang (2009), higher investments are associated with lower expected returns
via both decreasing return to scale and the discount rate eect. Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) and
Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004) further argue that rms have reduced risk and expected
return after growth options are exercised through capital investments.2
It is dicult to empirically distinguish the mispricing hypothesis from the optimal investment
1See Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008) for a survey of the large body of empirical literature on the relation of rms' nancing
and investments with operating performance and stock returns.
2In addition, several empirical studies, such as Agrawal, Jaee, and Mandelker (1992), Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen
(1995), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Rau and Vermaelen (1998), and Richardson and Sloan (2003), have subscribed to one
or multiple mispricing-based explanations. A few other studies have provided empirical evidence consistent with the optimal
investment eect; see, for example, Anderson and Garcia-Feijoo (2006), Fama and French (2006), and Xing (2008).
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hypothesis, because they oer similar predictions on the relation of corporate investments with both
future stock returns and rms' future operating performance. To address this issue, recent studies
have focused on conditional evidence in the U.S. by examining the eect of investment or nancing
on stock returns during subperiods or in subsamples of stocks. Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) nd that
the negative investment-return relation is stronger among rms with greater managerial investment
discretion, and is signicant only during the periods when external corporate governance is weak.
Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008) similarly show that the asset growth eect on stock returns weakens
during the periods of heightened external corporate oversight, but becomes stronger following higher
market returns when investor sentiment is stronger. In addition, Lipson, Mortal, and Schill (2011)
show that the asset growth eect is greater among stocks with higher arbitrage costs measured by
idiosyncratic return volatility.
While these studies favor mispricing-based interpretations, Li and Zhang (2010) point out that
in the q-theory model of corporate investment, the investment-return linkage should be stronger
among rms facing higher investment and nancing frictions. Empirically, they nd relatively weak
evidence for this prediction using various proxies for investments, investment frictions, and arbitrage
costs. However, using a more comprehensive set of arbitrage costs measures, Lam and Wei (2011)
report that the investment friction eect and the limits to arbitrage eect are supported by a similar
amount of evidence.
This study investigates the asset growth eect in international stock markets.3 We have two
goals. The rst is to examine whether the negative relation between asset growth and future stock
returns exists in nancial markets outside the U.S. An armative answer would alleviate the concern
that the empirical pattern documented in the U.S. is due to chance or data-snooping. Second, we
use the international data to evaluate the plausible economic causes of the asset growth eect. Our
approach builds upon Li and Zhang (2010) and Lam and Wei (2011), but the large variation in the
asset growth eect across countries and the large dispersion of country characteristics enable us to
perform a new set of tests for evaluating competing theories.
Using the Datastream-Worldscope data spanning the period from 1982 to 2010, we nd evidence
of a signicant asset growth eect in the international equity markets. When we pool stocks across
42 countries outside the U.S. and sort them into equal-weighted decile portfolios based on annual
3Throughout the paper, we use the term \country" and \market" interchangeably with the understanding that some markets,
such as Hong Kong, are not sovereign countries.
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asset growth rates (AG), the bottom AG decile outperforms the top decile by a signicant 6.43%
in the following year. When we form equal-weighted AG-sorted portfolios within each of the 42
countries, the return spread between the bottom and top AG portfolios, averaged across countries,
is also signicantly positive at 3.50% per year. The return-predictive power of asset growth remains
signicant after controlling for size, book-to-market, momentum, and operating protability. We also
nd that the magnitude of the asset growth eect varies substantially across countries. For example,
the equal-weighted annual return spreads between the bottom and top AG portfolios formed within
each country range from -11% to 11%. The return spreads are positive in 30 countries (including the
U.S.) but negative in 13 countries. Such cross-country divergence provides a rich ground for testing
various hypotheses on the cause of the asset growth eect.
Our cross-country analysis centers around two contrasting ideas that link the asset growth eect
to various country characteristics in opposite ways. First, if the asset growth eect is due to mis-
pricing, one would expect it to be stronger in countries where stocks are less eciently priced and
in countries where mispricing is dicult to arbitrage away. Further, if managerial empire-building,
capital structure market timing, or accounting manipulation is behind the asset growth anomaly,
one would expect this eect to be weaker in countries with stronger corporate governance, better
investor protection, and less room for accounting manipulation. Second, if the asset growth eect
is driven by optimal corporate investment decisions, one would expect this eect to be stronger in
markets where stocks are more eciently priced (i.e., prices staying closer to the fundamental values
and the expected returns exhibiting closer relation with risks). Based on these ideas, we formulate
three hypotheses and investigate them empirically.
The rst hypothesis we examine is on the relation between market eciency and the asset growth
eect. The optimal investment explanation suggests that the AG eect should be stronger among
countries where stocks are more eciently priced, whereas the mispricing explanation suggests the
opposite. We consider four country-level proxies for the eciency of a nancial market. The rst
is Morck, Yeung, and Yu's (2000) stock return synchronicity (R2), which is negatively related to
the amount of rm-specic information incorporated into individual stock prices. To compute R2,
we regress weekly individual stock returns on the contemporaneous weekly market returns as well
as two leads and two lags of the weekly market returns, and then take the average R-squared from
the rm-level regressions within each country. The second is the future earnings response coecient
(FERC) developed in the accounting literature (e.g., Collins et al. 1994), which captures the extent
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to which stock price reects information about future corporate earnings. The stock-level FERC is
calculated as the sum of three coecients on future earnings changes, which we obtain by regressing
the rm's annual stock returns on its current year's earnings change, three leads of its annual earnings
changes, and three leads of its annual stock returns. The country-level FERC is then given by the
mean of the FERC estimates across all rms in the country.
We use the developed-market status (DEV) provided by the International Finance Corporation
as our third market eciency proxy, in order to capture the idea that developed stock markets tend
to be more informationally ecient than emerging ones. Following La Porta et al. (1997), our fourth
variable, MKT, measures the importance of stock market to the economy. MKT is computed as
the sum of cross-country rankings on the following three variables - the ratio of total stock market
capitalization to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the number of publicly listed companies scaled
by the population, and the number of inital public oerings (IPOs) scaled by the population.
To quantify the magnitude of the asset growth eect in each country, we consider both the
return spread (SPREAD) between the extreme AG portfolios and the slope coecient (SLOPE)
from the cross-sectional regression of stock returns on asset growth rates. Both equal-weighted and
value-weighted versions of SPREAD and SLOPE are examined. Based on these measures, we nd
that the AG eect is stronger in countries with lower stock return synchronicity and higher future
earnings response coecients, in developed markets, and in economies where stock markets play a
more important role. These results suggest that the return-predictive power of AG is stronger in
countries with more ecient stock markets. Such evidence is supportive of the optimal investment
explanation but is dicult to reconcile with the mispricing explanation.
We further examine the role of market eciency in explaining the AG eect under a specic q-
theory prediction. Several recent studies (e.g., Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang, 2011) emphasize that
the investment-return relation is conditional on rm protability. We therefore construct alternative
measures of country-level asset growth eect using portfolio sorts and regressions that control for
rm-level return on equity. We nd that even if we use these alternative measures, the four proxies
for market eciency continue to exhibit strong power to explain the cross-country dierence in the
AG eect.
The second hypothesis we investigate is on the eect of limits to arbitrage. If the asset growth
eect is due to mispricing, it should be stronger when mispricing is dicult to arbitrage away. Con-
sistent with this hypothesis, Li and Zhang (2010), Lam and Wei (2011), and Lipson, Mortal, and
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Schill (2011) nd that the asset growth eect in the U.S. is stronger among stocks with higher trading
frictions. We evaluate this eect at the country level based on three measures of trading frictions,
namely, the average idiosyncratic return volatility (IRISK, residual standard deviations when regress-
ing daily individual stock returns onto market returns), the average stock liquidity (DVOL, dollar
trading volume), and an indicator for short-sale permission (SHORT). In sharp contrast with the
U.S. evidence from the existing studies, we nd that the cross-country relation between the limits
to arbitrage proxies and the AG eect is relatively weak. Only idiosyncratic return volatility IRISK
exhibits some marginal explanatory power, while DVOL and SHORT always have an insignicant
eect. Our results therefore suggest that the stock-level U.S. evidence in favor of the costly arbitrage
explanation cannot be generalized to account for the cross-country dierence in the asset growth
eect.
The third hypothesis we investigate is directly related to the potential causes of the asset growth
eect under the mispricing explanation. Existing studies have identied several sources of mispric-
ing associated with asset growth, such as rms' over-investment tendency, opportunistic nancing
behavior, and earnings management practices. Under these explanations, the asset growth eect on
stock return should be stronger among countries with less investor protection and lower account-
ing quality. Motivated by the law and nance literature, we consider four country-level proxies for
investor protection. First, following the idea of La Porta et al. (2000) that legal origin matters for in-
vestor protection and corporate governance, we classify countries into English, French, German, and
Scandinavian legal origins. Second, we adopt the La Porta et al. (1998) measure of creditor rights
index (CR), which is based on various aspects of legal protection on the rights of secured lenders in a
country. Third, we use the revised anti-director rights index (AD) constructed by Djankov, McLiesh,
and Shleifer (2007), which measures the protection of minority shareholders against expropriation
by controlling shareholders. Fourth, the anti-self-dealing index (AS) is from Djankov et al. (2008)
and captures the protection of outside investors against self-dealing by the controlling shareholders.
We further follow the existing literature to construct two country-level proxies for the quality
of accounting information. The rst is the accounting quality index (ACCT) of La Porta et al.
(1998) based on the reporting or omission of 90 items in corporate nancial reporting. The second,
earnings management score (EMS), is developed by Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) to quantify
the discretion by corporate insiders in managing reported earnings. However, from the cross-country
regression analysis incorporating this extensive list of proxies, we nd quite weak and sometimes
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conicting evidence for the hypothesis that investor protection and accounting quality reduce the
magnitude of the AG eect.
In sum, our paper documents the existence of the asset growth eect in international stock
markets and provide informative evidence to assess dierent hypotheses regarding this eect. As such,
our study joins the expanding literature (e.g., McLean, Ponti, and Watanabe, 2009; Hou, Karolyi,
and Kho, 2011) that looks at international evidence for various forms of stock return predictability
originally documented in the U.S. Our study also adds to the literature that attemps to disentangle
competing explanations for the asset growth eect based on the U.S. data, e.g., Li and Zhang
(2010), Lam and Wei (2011), and Lipson, Mortal, and Schill (2011). Relative to these studies, our
incremental contribution is to take advantage of the wide dispersion in the asset growth eect across
countries and oer a fresh set of perspectives. In particular, the international data enable us to
examine the two hypotheses that have not been considered by the existing studies, namely, the eect
of information eciency and the eect of investor protection and accouting quality.
In a contemporaneous study, Titman, Wei, and Xie (2011) show that the access to external
nancing is an important determinant of the magnitude of the asset growth eect within the devel-
oped markets. Relative to their study, our analysis includes a more comprehensive set of country
characteristics and covers both the developed and emerging markets. Overall, our study provides
more supportive evidence for the optimal investment explanation than for the mispricing-based ex-
planation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the competing explanations
of the asset growth eect and outlines testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and provides
evidence on the existence of the asset growth eect in international markets. Section 4 evaluates the
hypotheses by analyzing the relation between country characteristics and the asset growth eect.
Section 5 concludes.
2. Hypothesis development
In this section, we rst describe various explanations proposed in the literature on the relation
between investment and stock returns. Based on these explanations, we then outline hypotheses
that can be tested using the international data.
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2.1 Optimal investment eects
The optimal investment explanations of the investment-return relation are based on either the q
theory or the eect of real options.
For illustration purpose, we adopt the model of Li and Zhang (2010) to highlight the two invest-
ment eects motivated by the q theory. There are two periods, 0 and 1. Firm i makes investment Ii0
during period 0 and incurs a convex investment adjustment cost. The rm's capital Kit evolves as
Ki1 = Ii0 + (1  )Ki0, where  is the capital depreciation rate. The investment adjustment cost is
quadratic in Ii0: C(Ii0;Ki0) =
i
2

Ii0
Ki0
2
Ki0, where a higher value of i indicates a higher degree of
investment friction. The rm's operating prot is Kit (t=0 and 1), where  is the marginal produc-
tivity of capital. Given the above information, the rm's free cash ow is Ki0   Ii0   i2

Ii0
Ki0
2
Ki0
for period 0 and Ki1 + (1  )Ki1 for period 1 (assuming no capital investment beyond period 0).
The rm's objective is to maximize the present value of the free cash ows (see Equation (2) of
Li and Zhang (2010)):
max
Ii0
Ki0   Ii0   i
2

Ii0
Ki0
2
Ki0 +
1
Ri
[Ki1 + (1  )Ki1] (1)
where Ri is the discount rate or the expected return. The rst-order condition for the rm's optimal
investment is (see Equation (3) of Li and Zhang (2010)):
Ri =
+ 1  
1 + i(Ii0=Ki0)
: (2)
Note that the left-hand-side of the above expression is the cost of capital, while the right-hand-side
can be interpreted as the marginal investment return, i.e., the marginal benet of investment divided
by the marginal cost of investment. Therefore, the rst-order condition suggests that the optimal
level of investment is reached when the cost of capital equals the marginal return on investment.
The rst investment eect on expected return, often termed the \discount rate channel," is due
to Cochrane (1991, 1996). Holding protability () and depreciation rate () constant, for the
optimality condition described by Equation (2) to hold, rms with larger observed investments (i.e.,
higher Ii0=Ki0) must be those with lower discount rates Ri. Hence, a negative cross-sectional relation
between investment and return arises.4
4A further implication of the \discount rate channel" is examined by Li and Zhang (2010). They show that, based on the
above optimality condition (2), the sensitivity of investment (Ii0=Ki0) to expected return (Ri) is increasing in the adjustment
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The second investment eect on expected return is the \cash ow channel" proposed by Lyandres,
Sun, and Zhang (2008) and Li, Livdan, and Zhang (2009). The key to this eect is decreasing return
to scale, i.e., the marginal productivity of capital  is a decreasing function of investment. Note
that the right-hand-side of the above expression (2) is the investment return. If  decreases with
investment, then the right-hand-side of the expression decreases in investment. Thus, the left-hand-
side of the expression, the expected return, must also be decreasing in investment. Wu, Zhang, and
Zhang (2010) discuss both the discount rate channel and the cash ow channel in the context of the
accruals anomaly.
The real option literature also oers an explanation of the asset growth eect. It is based on
the assumption that real options are riskier than assets in place. When rms make investments,
real options are exercised and converted into less risky assets in place. Thus, rms making large
investments tend to have lower risk and lower expected returns in the future. Studies on this real
option eect of investment include, for example, Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) and Carlson, Fisher,
and Giammarino (2004).
2.2 Mispricing-based explanations
The literature has proposed four types of mispricing-based explanations on the negative investment-
return relation.
The rst explanation is based on over-investment. Corporate managers are subject to agency
problems when they make investment decisions on behalf of the rms. Due to their empire-building
tendency, managers may invest in projects with negative net present values, thus reducing rm value.
Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) link this observation to the negative investment-return relation under
the additional assumption of investor misreaction. That is, if investors do not fully understand the
agency problem of over-investment, they may over-value a rm with large investments by over-valuing
its potential future cash ows. The low return subsequent to large investment hence reects a market
correction of the initial over-valuation.
The second explanation is based on rms' market timing behavior in nancing decisions (e.g.,
Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Since rms (or corporate insiders) have better information about their
own values, they may opportunistically raise equity nancing when their stocks are over-priced and
cost parameter i, a proxy for investment friction. In other words, the negative relation between investment and expected return
should be stronger among rms facing higher investment frictions.
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buy back shares when their stocks are under-valued. If investors do not fully take such opportunistic
corporate behavior into account when they value stocks, this leads to a negative relation between
corporate nancing and subsequent stock returns. If asset growth is driven by external nancing, a
negative relation between asset growth and stock returns ensues.
The third explanation is corporate earnings management (e.g., Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998a;
1998b). Prior to raising external nancing or engaging in acquisitions, rms may have incentives
to manipulate reported corporate earnings upward in order to obtain favorable market valuation or
nancing terms. Hence, even though asset growth (via nancing or investment) has no causal eect
on future returns, earnings management may create a contemporaneous association between asset
growth and over-valuation, resulting in an observable negative relation between asset growth and
subsequent stock returns.
There is a fourth potential explanation based on investors' extrapolation bias. As pointed out
by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994), investors may excessively extrapolate from rms' past
growth when they value stocks. Such excessive extrapolation results in overvaluation of rms with
high past growth and their low future returns. The extrapolation bias is originally proposed to
explain the sales growth anomaly and related value anomalies. However, as pointed out by Cooper,
Gulen, and Schill (2008), it could also be applied to the asset growth eect.
Note that all the four mispricing-based explanations depend on the assumption that investors
misreact to publicly available information when they value stocks, and the lower returns to stocks
with higher asset growth rates are a form of market correction of initial misreaction. The rst three
explanations further depend on the existence of agency problems or asymmetric information on the
part of rms or corporate managers. The fourth extrapolation-based explanation does not necessarily
depend on the behavior of rms or corporate managers.
2.3 Testable hypotheses
As discussed above, existing studies have proposed a quite diverse set of explanations on the asset
growth eect. The objective of this study is not to empirically validate every aspect of these expla-
nations. Rather, we attempt to distill a few predictions that can be tested at the country level using
the international data.
Our rst hypothesis focuses on the role of market eciency. The optimal investment eect, based
on either the q theory or the real options model, requires certain degree of market eciency. That
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is, stocks must be priced to correctly reect the eect of optimal corporate investments on expected
cash ows and the amount of risk involved. When the stock prices are noisy and do not accurately
reect the corporate fundamental information, the eect of optimal corporate investment on stock
valuation may be thrown o. At the opposite side of the coin, when stock prices eciently reect
rms' fundamental information, mispricing should be less rampant. Therefore, if the asset growth
eect is due to various forms of mispricing, its magnitude should be weaker in more ecient nancial
markets. Based on this discussion, we have the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis H1: Under the optimal investment explanation, the asset growth eect is stronger in
stock markets that are more informationally ecient. Under the mispricing-based explanation, the
asset growth eect is weaker in markets that are more informationally ecient.
The second hypothesis is developed from the mispricing perspective. If the asset growth eect
is due to mispricing, it should be weaker when it is easier for sophisticated investors to trade on
systematic patterns of mispricing. Essentially, we investigate an international version of the limits-
to-arbitrage hypothesis examined by Li and Zhang (2010), Lam and Wei (2011), and Lipson, Mortal,
and Schill (2011). An advantage of testing it in the international data is the large variation in trad-
ing frictions across markets. For example, eight markets in our sample have explicit restrictions on
equity short-selling.
Hypothesis H2: Under the mispricing-based explanation, the asset growth eect is stronger in
markets with severer limits to arbitrage.
The third hypothesis is further developed from the mispricing perspective. However, dierent
from the second hypothesis, the focus now is directly on the causes of the mispricing of asset growth.
As discussed earlier, with the exception of the extrapolation bias eect, the other three mispricing-
based explanations rely on managers' agency problem (the over-investment hypothesis) and/or asym-
metric information (the market timing hypothesis and the earnings management hypothesis). Thus,
we expect the magnitude of the asset growth eect to be linked to corporate governance, protection of
outside investors, the quality of disclosed accounting information, and the rampancy of the earnings
manipulation practice.
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Hypothesis H3: Under the mispricing-based explanation, the asset growth eect is stronger in
markets with less investor protection, weaker corporate governance mechanism, poorer accounting
quality, and more prevalence of earnings management.
Hypothesis H2 has been the focus of existing studies based on the U.S. data (Li and Zhang, 2010;
Lam and Wei, 2011; and Lipson, Mortal, and Schill, 2011). However, the other two hypotheses have
not been examined in the literature.
3. International evidence on the asset growth eect
3.1 Data
The data on stock market variables and company accounting items are obtained from Thomson-
Reuter Datastream and Worldscope. We start with 54 countries for which full research level data
are available, and select common stocks traded on each country's major stock exchange(s) from both
active and defunct research les of Datastream to avoid survivorship bias. A single exchange with
the largest number of listed stocks is chosen for most countries, whereas multiple exchanges are
used for China (Shanghai and Shenzhen), Japan (Tokyo and Osaka), and the U.S. (NYSE, AMEX,
and NASDAQ). We further remove nancial rms that have Datastream industry codes (INDM)
corresponding to the four-digit SIC codes between 6000 and 6999.
To ensure the quality of the data from Datastream, we apply the following screening procedures
proposed by Ince and Porter (2006). First, we require that rms selected for each country are
domestically incorporated based on their home country information (GEOGC). To be included in
our sample, a stock must have a type of instrument indicator (TYPE) equal to equity (EQ) and
contain no words or phrases in its name (NAME) suggesting that the stock is not a common equity.5
Further, in order to screen for coding errors in monthly stock returns (i.e., the percentage change in
Datastream's month-end total return index RI), any return above 300% that is reversed within one
month is treated as missing. To be more exact, if rt and rt 1 are the gross returns in month t and
t 1, we set rt and rt 1 to missing if rt or rt 1 is greater than 300% and (1+rt)(1+rt 1) 1 < 50%.
We also eliminate all monthly observations for delisted stocks from the end of the sample period
5Specically, we eliminate preferred stocks, closed-end funds, exchange-traded funds, real estate investment trusts, and war-
rants by identifying rms whose names contain words such as \pf", \pref", \fund", \reit", \trust", \warrant", etc.
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to the rst non-zero return date since Datastream keeps padding the last available data after the
delisting date.
In addition, we follow McLean, Ponti, and Watanabe (2009) to trim monthly returns at the top
and bottom one percentiles within each country, as such extreme returns are likely due to data errors.
To ensure the quality of the accounting data from Worldscope, we also follow McLean, Ponti, and
Watanabe (2009) to winsorize all relevant Worldscope variables at the top and bottom one percentiles
of their distributions within each country.
A main variable of interest is the asset growth rate (AG). Following Cooper, Gulen, and Schill
(2008), AG observed at the end of June of year t is the percentage change in total assets from the
end of scal year t  2 to the end of scal year t  1, where scal year t is dened as the scal year
ending in calendar year t. Total assets in local currency is the Worldscope item 02999. To compute
AG, we require that a rm has a positive value for total assets at the end of both scal years t  2
and t   1. In addition to the winsorization procedure described in the above paragraph, we treat
rm-year observations with absolute values of AG exceeding 1,000% as coding errors and exclude
them from analysis.
Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the sample consisting of the 54 markets including
the U.S. The starting date of inclusion in the sample varies across countries, depending on each
country's data availability. The sample consists of 291,725 rm-year observations when the U.S. is
included and 222,418 observations when the U.S. is excluded. The U.S. represents the largest part
of the overall sample, accounting for 24% of the total rm-year observations and 41% of the total
market capitalization on average. Japan and the United Kingdom are the second and third largest,
accounting for 15% and 8% of the total observations and 14% and 7% of the total market value,
respectively. While the remaining countries typically each account for less than 5% of the total
observations and market value, the sample covers a variety of countries from dierent regions.
The last two columns of Table 1 provide the median and standard deviation of the asset growth
rates (AG) for each country averaged across sample years. There is noticeable cross-country dis-
persion in these statistics, with the median AG ranging between -52.32% (Zimbabwe) and 29.45%
(Turkey) and the standard deviation between 7.51% (Bangladesh) and 233.04% (Zimbabwe). We
also nd that the cross-rm variation in the asset growth rate is slightly smaller outside the U.S.
(46.30%) than in the U.S. (51.73%). The greater homogeneity of asset growth rates relative to the
U.S. has been previously documented by Yao et al. (2011) for the nine Asian markets.
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Our cross-country analysis requires a reliable estimate of the country-level asset growth eect,
which in turn requires a meaningful cross-section of stocks within a market. Thus, we construct a
sample for the cross-country analysis by imposing the following criterion { in each year, we require a
market to have at least 30 stocks with valid observations of asset growth, market capitalization, and
annual stock returns. For the period between July of 1982 and June of 2010, 11 out of 54 markets
never meet this criteria, resulting in a 43-market sample including the U.S.6 Also as a result, a few
countries have shorter sample years relative to what are implied by the beginning and ending dates
in Table 1.
3.2 Asset growth and stock returns
Two measures are used to quantify the magnitude of the asset growth (AG) eect within each country.
The rst is the return spread of sorted portfolios. Specically, we sort stocks in each country at the
end of June of year t into portfolios based on AG observed at that time point. We use the following
procedure to ensure that we have a sucient number of stocks in each portfolio. If the number of
stocks for a market is between 30 and 50 in a given year, we form tercile portfolios. If the number
of stocks is between 50 and 100, we form quintiles. Finally, we form deciles if a specic market has
more than 100 stocks in a given year. We refer to these portfolios as the AG-bucket portfolios. We
obtain monthly stock returns from Datastream and compute one-year holding-period return for each
stock from July of year t to June of year t+ 1. Based on the annual stock returns, we calculate the
annual return spread by subtracting the top-bucket AG portfolio returns from the bottom-bucket
AG portfolio returns, which is denoted as SPREAD.
The second measure of the asset growth eect is derived from univariate predictive regressions.
Within each country, we regress annual stock returns from July of year t to June of year t+1 cross-
sectionally on asset growth observed in June of year t. The measure of the per-unit asset growth
eect, SLOPE, is negative one times the regression coecient, so that a positive value of SLOPE
indicates a negative relation between asset growth and stock returns.
To ensure the robustness of inference, we measure SPREAD and SLOPE based on both equal-
6The 11 markets excluded are Bangladesh, Colombia, Cyprus, Hungary, Kenya, Luxembourg, Morocco, Russia, Sri Lanka,
Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. Several recent studies on international stock markets have used a similar selection criterion and a
similar set of markets. For example, McLean, Ponti, and Watanabe (2009) include 41 countries in their study for the period
between 1981 and 2006. Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012) include 40 countries for the period between 1995 and 2009. The
sample used in Hou, Karolyi, and Kho (2011) broadly includes 49 countries from 1981 to 2003, although they do not impose a
restriction on the minimum number of stocks in the cross-section within a country.
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weighting and value-weighting, denominated in both local currency and U.S. dollar (USD). The
weights for the value-weighted SPREAD are based on the market capitalizations of individual stocks.
The value-weighted SLOPE is obtained from weighted-least-squares (WLS) regressions, where the
weights are again based on the market capitalizations of individual stocks.
Table 2 depicts the magnitude of the asset growth eect in each of the 43 countries that meet
the 30-stock requirement described earlier. The rst variable reported in Panel A of this table, asset
growth spread AGSPREAD, is the dierence in the average asset growth rates between the top
and bottom AG buckets. For the U.S. market, AGSPREAD is 136.20%. Only a handful of other
markets, such as Hong Kong, Australia, Norway, U.K., and Canada, have AGSPREAD higher than
the U.S. Panel A further reports equal-weighted SPREAD and SLOPE across countries, both in
local currency and in USD. Out of the 43 countries, 30 and 28 have positive values of SPREAD and
SLOPE measured in local currency, and 30 and 30 have positive values of SPREAD and SLOPE
measured in USD, respectively. Thus, the asset growth eect { the negative relation between asset
growth and stock return { is quite pervasive internationally.
We also nd that there exists a large dispersion in the magnitude of the AG eect across countries,
which is the focus of our subsequent analysis. Calculated in local currency, the equal-weighted
SPREAD ranges from -10.92% (Argentina) to 10.63% (Denmark), and the equal-weighted SLOPE
ranges from -25.98% (Taiwan) to 14.93% (Denmark). Alternatively when calculated in USD, the
equal-weighted SPREAD ranges from -4.99% (New Zealand) to 12.27% (Denmark), and theh equal-
weighted SLOPE ranges from -10.78% (Czech Republic) to 14.67% (Denmark).
Panel B of Table 2 reports the value-weighted SPREAD and SLOPE across countries, in local
currency and in USD. Out of the 43 countries, 25 and 30 have positive values of SPREAD and SLOPE
measured in local currency, and 27 and 33 have positive values of SPREAD and SLOPE measured in
USD, respectively. There is also a large dispersion in the magnitude of the value-weighted AG eect
across countries. Calculated in local currency, the value-weighted SPREAD ranges from -14.12%
(Czech Republic) to 15.38% (France), and the value-weighted SLOPE ranges from -7.67% (Taiwan)
to 18.84% (Ireland). Alternatively when calculated in USD, the value-weighted SPREAD ranges
from -14.16% (Thailand) to 16.93% (France), and the value-weighted SLOPE ranges from -11.45%
(Taiwan) to 21.31% (South Korea).
Panel C of Table 2 further reports statistics to assess the asset growth eect at the global level
using a global-pooling approach and a country-neutral approach. In the global-pooling approach,
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SPREAD is the annual USD-denominated return spread between stocks in the bottom and top AG
deciles when stocks are pooled across countries to form decile portfolios. Under the same approach,
SLOPE is negative one times the coecient of regressing USD-denominated annual stock returns
onto asset growth rates across all stocks regardless of their country belongings. In the country-neutral
approach, we estimate SPREAD and SLOPE within each country in each year as before based on
USD-denominated annual stock returns, and then take the cross-country averages each year. The
weights used in the value-weighted versions of SPREAD and SLOPE are given by USD-denominated
market capitalizations of individual stocks.
These global-pooling and country-neutral measures highlight the economic signicance of the
asset growth eect internationally. Within the sample of 43 countries with large cross-sections of
stocks (including the U.S.), the equal-weighted SPREAD under the global-pooling approach is 6.10%
(t=3.82, equivalent to an annualized Sharpe ratio of 0.722), and the value-weighted SPREAD is 4.17%
(t=1.90). For the same country sample and under the country-neutral approach, the equal-weighted
SPREAD is 3.55% while the value-weighted SPREAD is 3.77%, both statistically signicant at the
1% level. When we exclude the U.S. stocks, the resulting global-pooling SPREADs become 6.43%
and 4.04% (signicant at the 1% and 10% level) under equal- and value-weighting, respectively.
Similarly excluding the U.S., the country-neutral SPREADs are 3.50% when equal-weighted and
3.81% when value-weighted (both signicant at the 1% level).
The results based on the regression coecient SLOPE are similar. Under either global-pooling
or country-neutral approach, SLOPE is always signicantly positive with or without considering the
U.S. stocks. Overall, these results suggest that the asset growth eect exists in the global markets
outside the U.S.
Finally, for the purpose of completeness, Panel C of the table also reports the global asset growth
eect in the unrestricted sample of 54 countries, including the 11 countries that never meet the
30-stock requirement (hence not meaningful to report their country-level AG eect or to include
them in the country-neutral approach). As it turns out, the inclusion of these countries does not
substantially aect either SPREAD or SLOPE under the global-pooling approach. For example,
after including these countries and under equal-weighting, the globally-pooled SPREAD is 6.18%
(t=4.12) including the U.S. and 6.07% (t=3.79) excluding the U.S. Similarly, the globally-pooled
SLOPE is 3.94% (t=2.46) including the U.S. and 4.38% (t=3.13) excluding the U.S. These numbers
are quite close to those obtained for the 43-country sample.
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3.3 Variations and robustness
Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008) report that the U.S. asset growth eect is robust to the control of
return-predictive power of many rm characteristic variables; chiey among them are the size, value,
and momentum eects. Here we check whether the asset growth eect is robust to the control of these
eects in the international markets. Prior studies have shown the existence of the size, value, and
momentum eects in many countries outside the U.S.; see, for example, Heston, Rouwenhorst, and
Wessels (1995) for the size eect, Fama and French (1998) for the value eect, Rouwenhorst (1998)
and Grin, Ji, and Martin (2003) for the momentum eect, and Hou, Karolyi, and Lee (2011) for
a comprehensive study on all three eects. In addition, we examine various horizons over which the
asset growth rate predicts returns.
Following McLean, Ponti, and Watanabe (2009), we use the country-pooled Fama and MacBeth
(1973) regression approach to perform robustness analyses. Specically, we estimate cross-sectional
regressions in each year t in a way similar to how we obtain SLOPE. The dependent variable is the
USD-denominated holding-period return of individual stocks from all the countries in each of the
three following years, i.e., the rst year return from July of year t to June of year t+ 1, the second
year return from July of year t + 1 to June of year t + 2, and the third year return from July of
year t+ 2 to June of year t+ 3. The predictors include asset growth rate (AG), size (ME), book-to-
market ratio (BM), momentum (MOM), and country dummies. ME is the natural logarithm of the
USD-denominated market capitalization (Datastream variable MV) as of June of year t. BM is the
natural logarithm of the book value of common equity (Worldscope item 03501) at the end of scal
year t 1 divided by the market value of common equity at the end of December in year t 1. MOM
is the ve-month cumulative return from January to May in year t (computed using the monthly
percentage change in Datastream return index RI).
Table 3 reports the time-series averages of the estimated coecients and adjusted R2s. We do
not impose the minimum of 30 stocks requirement here, and produce regression results for the pooled
sample of 53 countries outside the U.S. and for the U.S. separately for comparison. We estimate the
regressions for the U.S. by both equal-weighting and value-weighting each observation. Alternatively
for the country-pooled sample, we follow McLean, Ponti, and Watanabe (2009) and run regressions
by both equal-weighting and scaled-weighting each observation. The scale-weighting regressions
assign each rm-return observation the weight that equals the rm's market value divided by the
average market value of the rm's country (both measured at the beginning of the holding period).
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Since the scaled-weighting is equivalent to a within-country value-weight, the results from the two
regressions show how the AG eect varies between small and large rms within each country. We
include country dummies in the pooled regressions to control for any country attributes that may
aect the relation between asset growth and returns, although their coecients are not reported for
the sake of brevity.
Panel A of Table 3 shows that the asset growth eect outside the U.S. is robust to the control
of the three rm-level characteristics. The equal-weighted coecients on AG are signicantly nega-
tive for all the holding periods, though turn less statistically signicant with the time horizon. The
scaled-weighted coecient, on the other hand, is signicant for the rst-year return regression. The
regression results for the U.S., reported in Panel B of Table 3, show that the AG coecients are sig-
nicant for the rst and second years, but turn insignicant in the third year under equal-weighting.
A comparison of the regression coecients in the two panels further reveals that, after controlling
for the size, value, and momentum eects, the U.S. does not dominate the international markets in
terms of the magnitude of the AG eect. For example, for the rst-year return, the equal-weighted
AG coecient is -0.027 for the international markets outside the U.S., versus -0.025 for the U.S.
market. Note that the relatively high R2s for the non-U.S. sample compared to those for the U.S.
are due to the inclusion of country dummies in the regressions. Overall, these results indicate a ro-
bust negative eect of asset growth on future stock returns in international markets under dierent
weighting schemes and holding horizons.
Table 4 reports yet another variation in measuring the international asset growth eect, which
is designed specically with the q-theory explanation in mind. A few recent studies, such as Chen,
Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2011), point out that a rm's investment and protability jointly determine
its expected stock return under the q theory, and hence it is necessary to control for rm protability
when investigating the investment-return relation. To this end, we conduct a double-sorting portfolio
procedure while measuring rm protability by return on equity (ROE, Worldscope item 08301).
Specically, we independently sort stocks from all the 54 markets into ROE quintiles and AG quintiles
at the end of June of each year and produce 25 portfolios. We then compute the equal-weighted and
value-weighted USD returns on the 25 portfolios and the return spreads between the bottom and top
AG quintiles within each ROE quintile.
Table 4 shows that the asset growth eect continues to exist after controlling for rm protabil-
ity. For the equally weighted portfolios, the time-series averages of the return spreads subtracting
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the top from the bottom AG quintiles are 5.41%, 6.03%, 6.31%, 4.04%, and 4.64% across the ve
ROE quintiles. All the return spreads are statistically signicant except for the fourth ROE quintile
(t=1.57) and are relatively close in magnitude. The results are similar for the value-weighted port-
folios. Across the ve ROE quintiles, the return spreads between the bottom and top AG quintiles
are 5.48%, 7.18%, 5.68%, 4.72% and 6.23%, all signicantly positive. These results are in line with
the q-theory prediction on the investment-return relation.
4. Cross-country analysis
4.1 Country characteristics
In this section, we use cross-country analysis to evaluate various explanations for the asset growth
eect. To test the hypotheses outlined in Section 2, we identify three sets of relevant country
characteristics. The details of the variable constructions are provided in Appendix A. Below, we
describe the rationale for the selection of each variable.
The rst group of characteristics serves as proxies for market eciency. Recall from Section 2
that according to Hypothesis H1, the optimal investment explanation suggests a positive relation
between market eciency and the AG eect, while the mispricing explanation suggests the oppo-
site. The market eciency proxies consist of four measures, R2, FERC, DEV, and MKT. R2 is
the within-country average of the R-squared from rm-level regressions, in which individual stock
returns are regressed on market returns using weekly observations. According to Roll (1988), Morck,
Yeung, and Yu (2000), and Durnev et al. (2003), lower stock return synchronicity means more rm
specic information being impounded into stock prices, and thus R2 is inversely related to the pricing
eciency of a stock market. Supportive evidence for the inverse relation between R2 and information
eciency is also provided by, for example, Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004), Chen, Goldstein, and
Jiang (2006), and Jin and Myers (2006).7
The future earnings response coecient FERC as a measure of stock price eciency is developed
in the accounting literature, e.g., Collins et al. (1994). It is the sum of the coecients on future
earnings when annual stock returns are regressed on the changes in current and future earnings,
7In addition, a number of papers show that R2 is lower in countries where capital markets are more open (Li et al., 2004),
short sales are permitted (Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu, 2007), capital is better allocated and there is less government ownership in
the economy (Wurgler, 2000). However, a few studies have questioned the validity of this relation at the individual stock level;
see, e.g., Kelly (2005), Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2007), and Teoh, Yang, and Zhang (2009). Therefore, it is important to note that
our inference is not based on a single measure of eciency, but rather is reinforced by evidence based on multiple measures.
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thus intuitively capturing the extent to which information about future earnings is reected in stock
price movements. A series of accounting studies, such as Gelb and Zarowin (2002), Lundholm and
Myers (2002), Tucker and Zarowin (2006), and Orpurt and Zang (2009), have shown that FERC is
positively correlated with rm attributes that are indicative of informative stock prices, in particular
the quality of corporate information disclosure. In addition, Durnev et al. (2003) show that FERC is
signicantly higher for stocks with lower R2, another indication of stock price informativeness. The
country-level FERC we use is the average of FERCs estimated for individual stocks in the country.
Countries with greater FERCs are hence expected to be more informationlly ecient.8
The third and fourth proxies of market eciency, DEV and MKT, are based on the degree
of nancial market development, following the idea that stock prices are more ecient in more
developed nancial markets. DEV is an indicator for developed markets based on International
Finance Corporation 2009 classications.9 MKT is another measure of the development status of
nancial market. La Porta et al. (1997, hereafter LLSV) point out that when a market is more
developed and more ecient, public equity nancing is more active and plays a more important role
in the economy. Following LLSV (1997), MKT for a country is given by the sum of its cross-country
rankings of the following three variables: i) market capitalization of publicly listed companies as a
percentage of GDP,10 ii) the number of publicly listed companies scaled by population, and iii) the
number of IPOs scaled by population.
The second set of country characteristics gauges the severity of trading frictions, or the limits to
arbitrage, under Hypothesis H2. The variables include idiosyncratic risk of stock returns averaged
across rms (IRISK), stock dollar trading volume averaged across rms (DVOL), and an indicator
of no short sale restriction (SHORT) which equals to one when short-selling is allowed and zero
otherwise, obtained from Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007). Trading frictions limit the ability of
sophisticated investors to arbitrage away stock mispricing. Li and Zhang (2010), in their analysis of
the U.S. data, consider two stock-level proxies for the limits to arbitrage: idiosyncratic volatility and
dollar trading volume. Our rst two measures are the country-level versions of theirs, and we use
8We require a rm to have at least 12 year of data for its stock-level FERC estimate to be valid. In three countries, Czech
Republic, Egypt, and Israel, we do not have sucient data to estimate any rm-level FERC and therefore we do not have their
country-level FERCs.
9Note that the emerging/developed-market status of a country can change over time. However, we do not have the complete
historical data to trace the evolution of a country's status. This is a reason why we construct the fourth market eciency proxy,
MKT, which is time varying.
10LLSV's original measure uses market capitalization of publicly listed rms owned by minority shareholders. We do not have
data for the fraction of minority ownership, thus our measure slightly diers from LLSV's. Our measure however is appropriate
for the purpose of this paper as a proxy for information eciency.
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the third variable to additionally captures the cross-country variations in the short-selling practice.
The third set of characteristics are related to investor protection and accounting quality under
Hypothesis H3. The country characteristics related to investor protection include creditor rights in-
dex (CR), the revised anti-director rights index (AD), the anti-self-dealing index (AS), and four legal
origin dummies. Following Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007), the creditor rights index (CR) is
the sum of four indicators for creditors' legal rights, including no automatic stay on assets, secured
creditors being rst paid, restrictions for going into reorganization, and removal of management in re-
organization. The revised anti-director rights index (AD) is adopted from Djankov et al. (2008) and
measures the degree of minority shareholder protection against expropriation by controlling share-
holders. Based on a similar idea but using a dierent data construction method, the anti-self-dealing
index (AS) of Djankov et al. (2008) measures the strength of minority shareholder protection against
self-dealing by the controlling shareholders. The legal origin dummies are indicators of a country's
investor protection and corporate governance eectiveness. We adopt the denition of LLSV (2000)
on the four major legal traditions, which are denoted as UK (United Kingdom), FR (France), GE
(Germany), and SC (Scandinavia), respectively. Countries with the English legal origin typically are
more eective in corporate governance, followed by the Scandinavian origin, and then the German
origin, with the French origin being the least protective (see e.g., LLSV, 2000).
Further, the country characteristics related to accounting quality include the accounting standard
index (ACCT) and the earnings management score (EMS). The accounting standard index (ACCT) is
constructed by LLSV (1998) to measure the quality of accounting and nancial reporting. It is based
on the reporting or omission of 90 items from corporate annual reports. The earnings management
score (EMS) is developed by Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) to capture the degree to which
corporate insiders can exercise their discretion to manage reported earnings. It is the average rank
of four earnings management proxies, two of which measure the ability to smooth earnings using
accounting accruals while the other two measure the management discretions in earnings reporting.
A higher value of the earnings management score signals poorer accounting quality and a higher
likelihood of earnings manipulation.
Table 5 reports the country characteristics for the 43 countries including the U.S. Except for
R2, MKT, IRISK, and DVOL, the rest of the country characteristics are time invariant. For the
four time-varying characteristics, we take the time series averages to obtain country specic values.
We also report their regional averages. Based on the DEV dummy, there are 24 developed markets
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and 19 emerging markets in the sample. FERC tends to be higher in developed markets than in
emerging markets. Consistent with Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), R2 tends to be higher in emerging
markets than in developed markets. However, R2 exhibits large variations in emerging markets. For
example, the countries with the lowest (0.09 for Czech Republic) and the highest (0.30 for Turkey)
R2 are both emerging markets. In addition, the value of MKT ranges from 25.00 (Czech Republic)
to 115.60 (Hong Kong) and has an average of 63.27.
As for the trading friction characteristics, the average idiosyncratic risk of stock returns (IRISK)
is 3.04%, with the lowest for Chile (1.77%) and the highest for Canada (5.28%). The average annual
dollar trading volume per stock (DVOL) is the lowest in Poland (USD 72 million) and the highest in
the U.S. (USD 1.85 trillion), with a cross-country average of USD 439 million. Finally, stock short
selling is explicitly prohibited in eight markets, including Singapore, South Korea, China, Indonesia,
Pakistan, Czech Republic, Greece, and Peru.
The table also provides various measures of investor protection and accounting quality for each
country. According to the creditor rights index CR, Hong Kong and New Zealand provide the
strongest creditor protection while France, Mexico, and Peru oer the weakest protection. Based on
the revised anti-director rights index AD and the anti-self-dealing index AS, Hong Kong, Singapore,
Malaysia, and U.K. rank among the highest in terms of corporate governance quality, whereas Greece
and Poland rank among the lowest. In addition, the quality of accounting information is the best
in Sweden (with the accounting standard index ACCT=83.00) and the U.S. (with the earnings
management score EMS=2.00), while it is the worst in Egypt (ACCT=24.00), Austria (EMS=28.30),
and Greece (EMS=28.30). Finally, among the 43 markets, 14 share the English legal origin, 16 have
the French legal origin, 9 have the German legal origin, and 4 have the Scandinavian legal origin.
In Table 6, we report the cross-sectional correlations among the country characteristics. Within
each of the three characteristic groups, variables are of similar economic nature and naturally have rel-
atively high correlations. For example, among the market eciency proxies, the correlation between
DEV and MKT is 0.50. FERC is negatively correlated with R2 (-0.06) but positively correlated with
DEV and MKT (0.35 and 0.29, respectively). Durnev et al. (2003) report a signicantly negative
relation between FERC and R2 across individual stocks in the U.S. By contrast, the country-level
correlation between FERC and R2 we obtain is relatively low. The correlations among the three
investor protection proxies CR, AD, and AS are all above 0.27 and can be as high as 0.54 (between
AS and AD). The two accounting quality measures ACCT and EMS have a correlation of -0.67, and
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their correlations with the investor protection proxies CR, AD, and AS are above 0.30 in absolute
value except between EMS and CR. Finally, similar to the ndings of previous studies such as LLSV
(1997; 1998), Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003), Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007), and Djankov
et al. (2008), legal origins matter for investor protection as well as for accounting quality. Markets
with English and Scandinavian legal origins tend to have higher CR, AD, AS, and ACCT, as well as
lower EMS.
We also nd substantial correlations among variables in dierent country-characteristic groups.
With only a small number of exceptions, markets with higher degree of eciency (lower R2, higher
FERC, DEV, and MKT) tend to have less trading frictions (lower IRISK, higher DVOL and SHORT),
better investor protection (higher CR, AD, and AS), higher accounting quality (higher ACCT, lower
EMS), and are more likely to have English or Scandinavian legal origins. Similar patterns have
been reported by existing studies. For example, consistent with the idea that investor protection
facilitates the development of nancial markets, LLSV (1997) nd positive correlations between MKT
and various investor protection measures. Morck, Yueng, and Yu (2000) and Li and Myers (2006)
also show that R2 is negatively correlated with the anti-director rights index AD and the accounting
quality measure ACCT.
In contrast, the correlations of trading friction measures with the proxies for investor protection
and accounting quality have mixed signs. Markets that permit short selling tend to have better
investor protection, higher accounting quality, and are more likely to have English or Scandinavian
legal origins. On the other hand, stock trading liquidity (measured by DVOL) exhibits insigni-
cant relations with investor protection (CR, AD, and AS) and legal origins, while having moderate
associations with accounting quality (ACCT and EMS). Finally, markets with higher idiosyncratic
stock return volatility (IRISK) actually have better investor protection (higher AD and AS), higher
accounting quality (higher ACCT and lower EMS), and are more likely to have English legal origin.
The fact that our market eciency proxies are negatively correlated with the limits-to-arbitrage
measures but positively correlated with the investor-protection and accounting-quality variables is
crucial to our analysis. Recall that, based on the optimal investment explanation, an improvement
in market eciency leads to a stronger negative eect of asset growth rates on subsequent stock
returns. Alternatively, according to the mispricing-based explanations, factors such as severer limits
to arbitrage, weaker corporate governance, and poorer accounting quality contribute to strengthen
the asset growth eect. It is important to notice that these contributing factors under the mispricing
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arguments are all inversely related to the degree of market eciency. Therefore, should we nd that
that there were a positive association between the extent of market eciency and the magnitude of
the asset growth eect, we can reliably conclude that the eect is more likely due to rms' optimal
investment behavior rather than due to various forms of mispricing.
4.2 Regression specication
The main variables of interest in our cross-country analysis are the country-level AG eect measures,
SPREAD and SLOPE, which have a panel data structure with both a country dimension and a
time dimension. Among the country characteristic variables, a few have both the country and time
dimensions (i.e., R2, MKT, IRISK, and DVOL) while others are time invariant (i.e., FERC, DEV,
SHORT, CR, AD, AS, ACCT, EMS, and the four legal origin dummies). Under such data structure,
the relation between a country characteristic variable and the AG eect measure (SPREAD or
SLOPE) also has two dimensions, which are often termed the within-eect and the between-eect
(e.g., Greene 2011). The former refers to the within-country relation between the time variation of
the AG eect and the time variation of the country characteristics. The latter refers to the cross-
country relation between the time-averaged AG eect and the time-averaged values of the country
characteristics.
In empirical analysis, we nd that it is generally the time-invariant part of the country char-
acteristics that bears explanatory power on the AG eect, whereas the time-varying part of the
characteristics typically do not have power. In other words, in the international stock markets, the
relation between country characteristics and the AG eect is mainly in the form of the between-eect
instead of the within-eect. Therefore, the main empirical results reported in the paper are based
on the cross-sectional regressions designed to capture the between-eect. Specically, we regress a
country-level measure of the asset growth eect cross-sectionally onto country characteristics. The
dependent variable is the time-series average of either SPREAD or SLOPE witin each country using
local currency. The independent variables are the time-series averages of the country characteristic
variables (if the country characteristics are time varying).
For statistical inference, the t-statistics for the cross-sectional regressions are computed using the
White (1980) heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. We note that this is a common approach
adopted by the existing studies performing country-level analysis; see, e.g., LLSV (1997; 1998),
Demirguc-Kunt and Maskimovic (1999), Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and
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Levine (2003), Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007), and Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012). For
the purpose of completeness, we describe the results of panel regressions designed to capture the
within-eect in Appendix B.
4.3 Empirical results
4.3.1 Analysis based on information eciency
Table 7 reports the empirical results for Hypothesis H1 regarding the cross-country relation between
market eciency and the AG eect. As discussed above, the cross-sectional regressions are designed
to measure the between-country eect. In Panel A, the dependent variable that captures country-
level magnitude of the AG eect is the within-country mean value of SPREAD. The results show
that both the equal-weighted and value-weighted versions of SPREAD are signicantly higher in
markets with lower R2 and higher FERC, in developed markets indicated by DEV, and in countries
with greater importance of stock market as measured by MKT. In the multiple regression where R2,
FERC, DEV, and MKT are jointly used as explanatory variables, the coecient for MKT under
the equal-weighted SPREAD and the coecients for FERC and MKT under the value-weighted
SPREAD become insignicant, possibly due to the high correlations among the market eciency
proxies.
The pattern is virtually the same in Panel B, where we use equal-weighted and value-weighted
SLOPE as the dependent variables. Overall, our analysis shows that the AG eect is stronger in
markets with greater information eciency. This result is consistent with the prediction of the
optimal investment hypothesis but inconsistent with the mispricing-based hypothesis.
Recall that a few recent studies, such as Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2011) built on the q
theory framework, point out that it is important to control for rms' operating protability when
examining the investment-return relation. We therefore repeat the same analysis using alternative
measures of the AG eect to control for rm protability. The rst, SPREAD2, is computed using
the double-sorting procedure with rm-level prot measured by the return on equity (ROE). In July
of each year t, we sort stocks within each country into terciles based on ROE and further divide
each ROE group into quintiles based on AG. We subsequently form ve AG portfolios by combining
all the stocks that are ranked into the same AG quintile but belong to the dierent ROE tertiles.
This procedure ensures that the average ROEs are compatible across the resulting ve AG portfolios.
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SPREAD2 is then given by the dierence in annual return from July of year t to June of year t+ 1
between the bottom and top AG portfolios formed in this way.
The second alternative measure, SLOPE2, is calculated based on multiple regressions. In each
year, we regress annual stock returns from July of year t to June of year t + 1 on both AG and
ROE for year t   1 within each country. SLOPE2 is then given by the negative one times the AG
coecient estimated from this regression. To ensure the accuracy of the new AG eect measures,
we require that a country has at least 50 stocks in a given year for its SPREAD2 and SLOPE2
estimates to be valid for that year. Similar to the construction of SPREAD and SLOPE, we develop
both equal-weighted and value-weighted measures of SPREAD2 and SLOPE2.
We continue with our cross-country regression analysis to study the relation between market
eciency and the AG eect. The dependent variable is now the equal-weighted or value-weighted
average of SPREAD2 or SLOPE2 measured in local currency for each country. As before, the ex-
planatory variables are the within-country time-series averages of the four market eciency proxies
(R2, FERC, DEV, and MKT). The univariate regression results reported in Table 8 show that
SPREAD2 and SLOPE2, both equal-weighted and value-weighted, are signicantly higher in coun-
tries with lower R2, higher FERC, higher MKT, and in developed markets indicated by DEV. In
the multiple regressions with all four regressors jointly included, R2, FERC, and DEV continue to
exhibit signicant impact on the magnitude of the country-level AG eect, whereas MKT loses its
explanatory power. The result remains the same even if we use dierent dependent variables. Our
ndings therefore lend further support to our earlier conclusion that greater market eciency leads
to a stronger investment-return relation, consistent with the prediction of the optimal investment
hypothesis.
4.3.2 Analysis based on limits to arbitrage
Using the same regression framework, we now test Hypothesis H2 on the relation between limits
to arbitrage and the AG eect. The dependent variable is, once again, either the equal-weighted
or value-weighted mean of SPREAD or SLOPE for each country. The explanatory variables are
the within-country time-series averages of the three limits-to-arbitrage proxies (IRISK, DVOL, and
SHORT). According to Hypothesis H2, the AG eect will be stronger in countries with greater
idiosyncratic volatility averaged across stocks (higher IRISK), with smaller average stock-level dollar
trading volume (lower DVOL), and where the short-selling restriction is in eect (lower SHORT).
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The cross-country regressions should therefore yield a positive slope on IRISK and negative slopes
on DVOL and SHORT to be consistent with Hypothesis H2.
The results are reported in Table 9. In Panel A, SPREAD is used as the dependent variable. In
univariate regressions, the coecient on IRISK is 0.018 when the dependent variable is the equal-
weighted SPREAD and 0.027 when the dependent variable is the value-weighted SPREAD. Both are
signicant at the 10% level. These results suggest that the AG eect is stronger in countries with
greater idiosyncratic volatilities, in line with the prediction of the limits to arbitrage argument. How-
ever, the other two limits to arbitrage proxies DVOL and SHORT do not have signicant explanatory
power on the country-level AG eect. In the multiple regressions, the coecients for IRISK remain
signicant and the coecients on the other two proxies DVOL and SHORT are still insignicant. In
Panel B of Table 9, the dependent variable is SLOPE. None of the three coecients on the limits to
arbitrage variables is signicant.
In their recent studies based on the U.S. individual stock data, Li and Zhang (2010), Lam and
Wei (2011), and Lipson, Mortal, and Schill (2011) nd that the negative eect of asset growth rates
on subsequent stock returns is stronger for rms with severer limits to arbitrage. In contrast, our
analysis using international data identies a relatively weak role of arbitrage costs in explaining the
country-level asset growth eect.
4.3.3 Analysis based on investor protection and accounting quality
As discussed in Section 2.2, factors such as corporate mangagers' empire-building tendency, rms'
capital-structure market timing, and corporate earnings manipulations may potentially cause mis-
pricing of asset growth. Hypothesis H3 links the AG eect to the country characteristics that proxy
for the rampancy of such corporate or managerial behavior. For the cross-sectional regressions to test
this hypothesis, the dependent variable is the equal-weighted or value-weighted mean of SPREAD or
SLOPE within each country. The explanatory variables are the measures of investor protection and
accounting quality including the creditor rights index CR, the revised anti-director index AD, the
anti-self-dealing index AS, the accounting standard index ACCT, the earnings management score
EMS, and the four legal origin dummies UK, FR, GE, and SC. When the four legal origin dummies
are used jointly as regressors, the regressions do not include an intercept.
Under Hypothesis H3, the coecients for CR, AD, AS, ACCT are expected to be negative and the
coecient for EMS is expected to be positive (as a higher EMS indicates more earnings manipulation).
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Given the relation between legal systems and the eectiveness of corporate governance described in
Section 4.1, we additionally expect the coecient on UK to be less positive relative to those of SC
and GE, with the largest coecient expected for FR.
Table 10 shows that the estimated coecients on most of the investor-protection and accounting-
quality proxies are insignicant regardless of the choice of the dependent variable, with a few excep-
tions. The rst exception is that AS bears a signicantly negative slope in the multiple regressions
when the dependent variable is the equal-weighted SPREAD (see Panel A), equal-weighted SLOPE,
or value-weighted SLOPE (see Panel B). The results imply that the negative investment-return rela-
tion is stronger in countries with weaker investor protection measured by the anti-self-dealing index.
However, this is the only signicant piece of evidence that is consistent with the mispricing-based
hypothesis. All the other signicant results contradict the prediction of Hypothesis H3. For example,
the regression slopes on UK and SC are signicantly positive when the equal-weighted SPREAD is
the dependent variable (see Model 6 of Panel A), whereas the slopes on FR and GE are signicantly
negative when the value-weighted SPREAD is instead used as the dependent variable (Model 7 of
Panel A). These ndings, together with the signicantly positive eects of UK on both the equal-
and value-weighted SLOPE (Model 6 of Panel B), lead us to conclude that the AG eect is stronger
in countries with the U.K. and Scandinavian legal origins where the investor protection is expected
to be superior.
Additional evidence against Hypothesis H3 is provided by the strong positive eects of ACCT on
the value-weighted SPREAD and SLOPE (see Models 4 and 7 of Panel A and Model 7 of Panel B,
respectively) and by the signicant negative eect of EMS on the value-weighted SPREAD (Model
5 of Panel A). Contrary to the mispricing-based arguments, these results suggest that worsening of
the accounting quality reduces the magnitude of the asset growth eect.
We note that the positive relation of investor protection and accounting quality with the AG
eect, as indicated by some of the signicant results reported above, may be explained by the opti-
mal investment eect. With better investor protection and lesser room for earnings manipulations,
managers' incentives align more with shareholders' and insiders' incentives also align more with
outsiders'. Thus, rms are more likely to undertake value-enhancing investments, leading to more
visible investment eect based on the q theory. Of course, this is only a second-order eect as it is
conditional on the nancial markets being informationally ecient in the rst place. Taken together,
our analysis nds relatively weak and somewhat conicting evidence for Hypothesis H3 regarding
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the eect of investor protection and accounting quality on the investment-return relation.
4.3.4 Horse-races among competing explanations
We have thus far evaluated how each group of country characteristics aects the magnitude of the
asset growth eect separately. A natural concern is that the correlations among the country charac-
teristics may confound our inference. According to the correlation patterns reported in Section 4.1,
markets that are more ecient tend to have fewer limits to arbitrage, better investor protection, and
higher accounting quality. The limits-to-arbitrage proxies also seem to correlate with the measures
of investor protection and accounting quality, although the directions of their correlations are mixed.
As we have argued in Section 4.1, the particular patterns of correlations observed between the
market eciency proxies and the remaining country characteristics enhance our ability to dierentiate
between the optimal investment hypothesis and the mispricing-based hypothesis. Since the two
hypotheses produce the opposite predictions as to how each of the country characteristics should aect
the asset growth eect, the confounding issue may be of minor concern for our study. Nevertheless, it
is desirable to examine the joint eects of the country characteristic variables given their substantial
correlations. The joint tests also allow us to spot the possibility that one eect (e.g., the mispricing-
based eect) emerges more strongly once we control for the other (e.g., the optimal investment
eect).
To assess the relative importance of the optimal investment eect and the mispricing-based eect,
we continue to rely on the cross-country multiple regression analysis. The dependent variable in our
regressions is the within-country mean of SPREAD or SLOPE. As for the explanatory variables in
each regression, we draw one proxy for information eciency and pair it either with one variable
motivated by the mispricing-based arguments or with the set of four legal origin dummies. Given
the high correlations among some of the variables (especially those within the same group), we do
not include all the country characteristics into a single regression.
Table 11 summarizes the results of the multiple regressions in which the dependent variable is
either the equal-weighted SPREAD (Panels A to D) or the equal-weighted SLOPE (Panels E to H).
We estimate 72 regressions, each of which contains a dierent set of a market eciency measure and a
mispricing-based variable as regressors. The results of the regressions, which use the value-weighted
SPREAD or SLOPE as the dependent variable, produce similar results and hence are omitted to
conserve space.
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The most notable nding in Table 11 is the robustness of the market eciency eect on the
investment-return relation. In all of the 72 regressions, the signs of the coecients on the informa-
tion eciency proxies conform to the predictions of the optimal investment explanation (i.e., negative
slope on R2 and positive slopes on FERC, DEV, and MKT). In 64 out of the 72 regressions, these
coecients are also signicant at least at the 10% level. Furthermore, in the remaining eight cases
where the eciency measures show insignicant eects, the jointly included mispricing-based vari-
ables also exhibit insignicant or counter-intuitive eects. Taken together, we nd no evidence that
the mispricing-based factors dominate rms' optimal investment behavior in driving the country-level
asset growth eect.
Turning to the role of limits to arbitrage, we identify that the coecients on IRISK, DVOL, and
SHORT are mostly insignicant. The only three exceptions are the signicantly positive eects of
IRISK on SPREAD when included together with R2 or FERC (Panels A and B, respectively), and
the signicantly negative eect of SHORT on SPREAD when added alongside FERC (Panel B).
The results imply a stronger AG eect in countries with greater average idiosyncratic volatility and
the short-selling restriction, in line with the mispricing-based perspective. However, we note that in
these three cases where the limits-to-arbitrage proxies have signicant slopes, the market eciency
measures (R2 and FERC) also bear signicant coecients. We therefore conclude that the role of
limits to arbitrage in aecting the magnitude of the AG eect is relatively weak, and it does not
eliminate the signicance of the optimal investment eect.
Lastly, we also nd that the slopes on the investor-protection and accounting-quality proxies are
also mostly insignicant, with ve exceptions. Four of the exceptions involve the legal origin dummies
US and SC (Panels A, B, and E), while the remaining one involves the accounting quality measure
ACCT (Panel B). The regression coecients on US, SC, and ACCT are positive in all of the ve
cases, suggesting that the AG eect strengthens as the investor protection and accounting quality
improve. This result is inconsistent with the mispricing-based explanation, but may be linked to the
second-order optimal investment eect mentioned earlier. Specically, as the investor protection and
accounting quality get better, rms become more likely to undertake value-enhancing investments,
making the q-theory based investment eect more visible.
Overall, the results of our cross-country multiple regressions suggest that the evidence for the
mispricing-based eects is weak, while that for the optimal investment eect tends to be much more
prevailing.
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5. Conclusion
The existing literature documents a negative relation of rms' investment and nancing activities
with future stock returns. For example, Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008) show that the U.S. rms
with lower asset growth rates tend to have higher subsequent stock returns. However, there is a
debate on whether such an empirical pattern is the result of market mispricing or can be viewed as
an optimal corporate investment eect.
Our study nds that the asset growth eect originally documented in the U.S. also exists in inter-
national equity markets. In addition, we provide informative evidence that allows us to evaluate the
optimal investment explanation of the asset growth eect vis-a-vis the mispricing-based explanation.
Across the 43 equity markets we examine, there are large dierences in the asset growth eect and in
various measures of market eciency, trading frictions, investor protection, and accounting quality.
The competing hypotheses predict that these country characteristics are related to the magnitude
of the asset growth eect in dierent ways. Empirically, we nd that the country characteristics
possessing the strongest power to explain the magnitude of the asset growth eects are those related
to market eciency { the asset growth eect is stronger in markets that are more informationally
ecient. On the other hand, the country characteristics representing limits to arbitrage, investor
protection, and accounting quality have limited power to explain the variation of the asset growth
eect across international markets.
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Appendix
A. Country characteristic variables
 Stock return synchronicity (R2): the R-squared of a regression in which weekly individual stock
returns are regressed on contemporaneous weekly market returns as well as two leads and two
lags of the weekly market returns. The inclusion of the leads and lags of market returns is to
control for non-synchronous trading. We run the regression for each stock every year and then
take the average R-squared from the rm-level regressions within each country to compute the
country-level R2. Both the individual stock returns and market returns are from Datastream.
 Future earnings response coecient (FERC): the sum of the coecients on future earnings
when current annual stock returns are regressed on the changes in current and future earnings.
Following Collins et al. (1994) and Durnev et al. (2003), the regression takes the form:
ri;t = a+ b0Ei;t +
X3
=1
bEi;t+ +
X3
=1
cri;t+ + ui;t
where Ei;t+ is the change in earnings per share from year t +    1 to year t +  , scaled
by the price at the beginning of year t+  . The change in earnings per share is the dierence
in the net income before extraordinary items/preferred dividend (Worldscope item 01551) and
preferred dividend (Worldscope item 05401), scaled by shares outstanding. ri;t+ is the annual
stock return of a rm from July of year t to June of year t+  . FERC is dened as
P3
=1 b .
We estimate FERC for each stock over the entire sample period, and then take the average
FERC across all stocks in a country to obtain the country-level FERC. We require a rm to
have at least 12 years of observations for its FERC estimate to be valid.
 DEV: an indicator for developed markets based on the 2009 International Finance Corporation
classication.
 MKT: the sum of the annual cross-country ranks of the following three variables: 1) a country's
market capitalization to GDP ratio, 2) the number of publicly listed companies scaled by
population, and 3) the number of IPOs scaled by population. We rank these variables across
countries in each year. Data are from the World Bank development index database.
 Idiosyncratic risk (IRISK): the annual value-weighted average of idiosyncratic volatility of all
stocks in a country. We follow Li and Zhang (2010) and estimate idiosyncratic volatility for
an individual stock every year by regressing daily stock returns on the value-weighted market
return from July 1st of year t   1 to June 30th of year t. A stock's idiosyncratic risk is the
standard deviation of the regression residuals. The data are from Datastream.
 Dollar trading volume (DVOL): the annual value-weighted average of dollar trading volume for
all stocks in a country. Dollar trading volume is the product of share volume and daily closing
price, summed from July of year t  1 to June of year t. The data are from Datastream.
 Short-sale permission (SHORT): a dummy variable equal to 1 if short selling is allowed and
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zero otherwise. We obtain this information from Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007). Following
McLean, Ponti, and Watanabe (2009), if short selling was legal prior to 1990, we assume that
short selling was allowed in each of the years prior to 1990.
 Creditor rights index (CR): an index measuring creditors' rights obtained from LLSV (1998). A
score of one is assigned when each of the following rights of secured lenders are dened in laws
and regulations. First, there are restrictions, such as creditor consent or minimum dividends,
for a debtor to le for reorganization. Second, secured creditors are able to seize their collateral
after the reorganization petition is approved, i.e., there is no \automatic stay" or \asset freeze."
Third, secured creditors are paid rst out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt rm, as
opposed to other creditors such as government or workers. Finally, management does not retain
administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization. CR is the sum of
the four scores, ranging from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights).
 Revised anti-director rights index (AD): the sum of 6 components, three of which are on share-
holder voting (voting by mail, voting without blocking of shares, and calling an extraordinary
meeting), and the remaining three are on minority protection (proportional board representa-
tion, preemptive rights, and judicial remedies). AD is obtained from Djankov et al. (2008).
The index ranges from 0 (weak shareholder protection) to 6 (strong shareholder protection).
 Anti-self-dealing index (AS): a survey-based measure of ex-ante and ex-post restrictions on
controlling shareholders' self-dealing, obtained from Djankov et al. (2008). The index ranges
from 0 (weak control of self-dealing transactions) to 1 (strong control).
 Accounting standards (ACCT): an index of accounting standards obtained from LLSV (1998).
The index is based on the reporting or omission of 90 items from annual reports. A higher
value of ACCT indicates higher accounting standards.
 Earning management score (EMS): a measure of earnings management tendency developed in
Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003), given by the average rank across the following four variables.
EM1 is the country's median ratio of the rm-level standard deviations of operating income
and operating cash ow (both scaled by lagged total assets). EM2 is the country's Spearman
correlation between the change in accruals and the change in cash ow from operations (both
scaled by lagged total assets). EM3 is the country's median ratio of the absolute value of
accruals and the absolute value of the cash ow from operations. EM4 is the number of \small
prots" divided by the number of \small losses" for each country. The aggregate earnings
management measure EMS is the average rank across all four measures, EM1-4. A higher
value of the EMS signals poorer earnings quality.
 UK: an indicator equal to one if a country has English legal origin. We obtain the data from
Andrei Shleifer's website.11 English origin countries typically are more eective in corporate
governance (LLSV, 2000).
11http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset. Same for FR, GE, and SC.
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 FR: an indicator equal to one if a country has French legal origin. Relative to English-origin
countries, French-origin countries are less eective in corporate governance (LLSV, 2000).
 GE: an indicator equal to one if a country has German legal origin. Relative to English-origin
countries, German-origin countries are less eective in corporate governance (LLSV, 2000).
 SC: an indicator equal to one if a country has Scandinavian legal origin. Scandinavian-origin
countries are less eective in corporate governance relative to English-origin countries, but
more eective than French-origin and German-origin countries (LLSV, 2000).
B. The within-eect regressions
Consider a full panel model of the asset growth eect in the following form:
Yi;t = 0 + 1Xi;t + ui + ei;t (3)
where Yi;t is a measure of the AG eect for country i in year t (SPREAD or SLOPE) and Xi;t is
a characteristic for country i in year t. 0 and 1 are coecients. The rst error term ui is time-
invariant and country-specic (modeled as either xed eects or random eects), and the second error
term ei;t has both country and time dimensions (it may have a time-varying but country-invariant
component, not singled out here).
In this model the relation between Yi;t and Xi;t has two dimensions { the relation between the
time variation of the AG eect and the time variation of the country characteristic within a given
country (i.e., the within-eect), and the cross-country relation between the average AG eect and the
average country characteristic (i.e., the between-eect). These two types of relations are captured
by the following two regressions, respectively:
Yi;t   Yi = 2(Xi;t   Xi) + ei;t (within-eect) (4)
Yi = 3 + 4 Xi + ui (between-eect) (5)
where Yi and Xi are the means of Yi;t and Xi;t for country i. The coecients of the full panel model
(3), when properly estimated, are the weighted averages of the corresponding coecients from the
within-eect regression (4) and the between-eect regression (5).
All the empirical results for the cross-country analysis reported in the main text of the paper are
based on the between-eect regression (5). Below, for the purpose of completeness, we further report
the results of the within-eect regression (4) for country characteristics that are time-varying, i.e.,
R2, MKT, IRISK, and DVOL. The regressions include year xed dummies, and the t-statistics are
computed using two-way clustered standard errors (by country and by year). As it turns out, the
t-statistics for the coecients in these within-eect regressions are all insignicant.
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Table A.1: The within-eect Regressions
Panel A: SPREAD as dependent variable
Equal-weighted SPREAD Value-weighted SPREAD
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
R2 -0.157 -0.064
(-0.892) (-0.361)
MKT 0.046 0.087
(0.933) (1.092)
IRISK 0.042 0.065
(1.238) (1.544)
DVOL -0.016 -0.019
(-1.215) (-1.332)
Intercept -0.002 0.071* -0.105*** 0.035*** 0.010 0.078 -0.180** 0.027**
(-0.082) (1.955) (-2.590) (3.944) (0.294) (1.430) (-2.393) (2.058)
Panel B: SLOPE as dependent variable
Equal-weighted SLOPE Value-weighted SLOPE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
R2 -0.257 0.268
(-1.023) (1.223)
MKT 0.052 -0.073
(0.917) (-1.209)
IRISK 0.031 0.030
(1.218) (1.103)
DVOL -0.006 -0.006
(-0.357) (-0.571)
Intercept -0.015 0.082* -0.067 0.032*** -0.018 0.083* -0.066 0.029**
(-0.344) (1.782) (-1.426) (2.785) (-0.442) (1.896) (-1.495) (2.456)
This table reports the results of the within-eect regressions on the asset growth eect. The
dependent variables are the country-level measures of the asset growth eect, SPREAD and
SLOPE, in both the equal-weighted and value-weighted versions. The weights for the value-
weighted measures of SPREAD and SLOPE are based on rms' market capitalizations. The
independent variables are the time-varying country characteristics R2, MKT, IRISK, and DVOL.
For the dependent variable as well as the explanatory variables in each regression, we subtract
their respective country-specic means before including them in the regressions. Panel A reports
the regression results when SPREAD is used as the dependent variable. Panel B presents the
regression results when SLOPE is used as the dependent variable. Two-way clustered standard
errors (by country and by year) are used to compute the t-statistics reported in parentheses.
Statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
The sample period is from July of 1982 to June of 2010.
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Table 3: Robustness of the Asset Growth Eect: Alternative Horizons and Weightings, and Con-
trolling for Additional Firm Characteristics
Panel A: All countries excluding U.S.
Horizon First Year Second Year Third Year
Weighting Equal Scaled Equal Scaled Equal Scaled
AG -0.027*** -0.028** -0.025** 0.006 -0.026* -0.014
(-3.266) (-2.131) (-2.774) (0.409) (-1.949) (-0.488)
ME -0.005 0.001 -0.005* -0.001 -0.003 -0.002
(-1.663) (0.245) (-1.835) (-0.127) (-0.897) (-0.329)
BM 0.041*** 0.044*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.029*** 0.027***
(4.152) (4.688) (3.805) (4.047) (3.514) (3.618)
MOM 0.073*** 0.081*** -0.029*** -0.036* -0.022** -0.033**
(3.873) (3.351) (-3.215) (-1.922) (-2.410) (-2.280)
Intercept 0.212*** 0.292*** 0.318*** 0.250* 0.184** 0.178
(3.687) (3.871) (3.353) (1.957) (2.218) (1.386)
R2 0.251 0.315 0.240 0.309 0.232 0.302
Panel B: U.S.
Horizon First Year Second Year Third Year
Weighting Equal Value Equal Value Equal Value
AG -0.025** -0.021 -0.015** -0.014 0.008 0.013
(-2.096) (-0.859) (-2.538) (-0.910) (1.080) (0.459)
ME -0.014* -0.003 -0.006 0.001 -0.003 -0.003
(-1.821) (-0.520) (-1.033) (0.147) (-0.596) (-0.470)
BM 0.011 -0.001 0.019 0.003 0.021** 0.000
(0.739) (-0.055) (1.662) (0.220) (2.574) (0.040)
MOM 0.056*** 0.091** -0.020 -0.009 0.007 0.015
(3.439) (2.178) (-1.342) (-0.295) (0.468) (0.526)
Intercept 0.264*** 0.176** 0.180*** 0.119* 0.178*** 0.173**
(3.666) (2.655) (3.055) (1.986) (3.606) (2.767)
R2 0.041 0.087 0.032 0.075 0.023 0.072
This table reports the results of the Fama-MacBeth regressions which examine the robustness of the
asset growth eect. Panel A reports the regression results for stocks pooled across all 53 countries
excluding the U.S., and Panel B presents the results for the U.S. stocks only. The dependent variable
is the individual stock return measured over the rst-, second- or third-year holding period (relative
to June of year t, the time of the asset growth rate measurement). The explanatory variables include
the asset growth rate and control variables, including ME (the natural logarithm of the June-end
market value in year t), BM (the natural logarithm of the scal year-end book-to-market ratio in
year t  1) and MOM (the January-to-May cumulative return in year t). The regressions use both
equal weights (\Equal") and value weights within country (\Scaled" in Panel A and \Value" in
Panel B). The value weight is based on each rm's market capitalization divided by the average
(total) market capitalization of the country in June of year t in Panel A (Panel B). In Panel A
the regressions include country dummies, whose coecients are not reported. The sample period is
from July of 1982 to June of 2010. The t-statistics are adjusted for time-series autocorrelation and
reported in the parentheses. Statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by
***, **, and *, respectively.
45
Table 4: The Asset Growth Eect: Controlling for Firm Protability
Panel A: Equal-weighted portfolios
Low ROE 2 3 4 High ROE
Low AG 17.00 19.62 20.70 19.75 20.61
2 18.27 19.68 20.01 19.19 17.24
3 14.46 18.13 20.10 19.46 19.09
4 16.91 16.10 17.44 16.88 17.82
High AG 11.59 13.59 14.40 15.71 15.97
Low - High 5.41*** 6.03*** 6.31*** 4.04 4.64**
t-stat (2.65) (4.98) (3.71) (1.57) (2.10)
Panel B: Value-weighted portfolios
Low ROE 2 3 4 High ROE
Low AG 14.95 18.37 19.35 17.37 19.97
2 15.40 17.96 17.50 16.48 15.35
3 12.25 16.69 17.58 17.47 17.09
4 17.22 14.89 16.66 15.97 15.29
High AG 9.47 11.20 13.68 12.65 13.75
Low - High 5.48** 7.18*** 5.68** 4.72* 6.23**
t-stat (2.88) (4.49) (2.88) (1.70) (2.19)
This table reports the percentage annual returns on two-way sorted portfo-
lios, which measure the asset growth eects after controlling for rm prof-
itability. At the end of June of each year, stocks pooled across all the 54 mar-
kets are independently sorted into asset growth (AG) quintiles and return-
on-equity (ROE) quintiles. We then compute the equal-weighted (Panel A)
and value-weighted (Panel B) returns on the resulting 25 portfolios and the
return spreads between the bottom and top AG quintiles (Low - High) within
each ROE group. Returns are computed from July of year t to June of year
t + 1. The sample period is from July of 1982 to June of 2010. The rows
labeled \t-stat" show t-statistics for the Low - High return spreads computed
using the Newey-West (1987) heteroscedastic-robust standard errors.
46
T
a
b
le
5
:
C
o
u
n
tr
y
C
h
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
R
eg
io
n
C
o
u
n
tr
y
R
2
F
E
R
C
D
E
V
M
K
T
IR
IS
K
D
V
O
L
S
H
O
R
T
C
R
A
D
A
S
A
C
C
T
E
M
S
U
K
F
R
G
E
S
C
A
fr
ic
a
-
E
m
er
g
in
g
E
g
y
p
t
0
.2
3
0
4
1
.0
0
2
.5
8
1
9
5
.3
2
2
.0
0
3
.0
0
0
.2
0
2
4
.0
0
0
1
0
0
S
o
u
th
A
fr
ic
a
0
.1
4
1
.2
3
0
7
4
.2
0
3
.7
2
1
7
8
.7
1
1
3
.0
0
5
.0
0
0
.8
1
7
0
.0
0
5
.6
0
1
0
0
0
R
eg
io
n
a
l
A
v
er
a
g
e
0
.1
8
1
.2
3
0
5
7
.6
0
3
.1
5
1
8
7
.0
1
1
2
.5
0
4
.0
0
0
.5
1
4
7
.0
0
5
.6
0
0
.5
0
0
.5
0
0
0
A
si
a
-
D
ev
el
o
p
ed
H
o
n
g
K
o
n
g
0
.1
8
0
.7
5
1
1
1
5
.6
0
3
.3
3
3
7
5
.0
5
1
4
.0
0
5
.0
0
0
.9
6
6
9
.0
0
1
9
.5
0
1
0
0
0
Is
ra
el
0
.1
2
1
8
5
.8
6
3
.0
8
1
2
5
.2
3
1
4
.0
0
0
.7
3
6
4
.0
0
1
0
0
0
J
a
p
a
n
0
.2
7
1
.8
0
1
7
9
.7
5
2
.4
5
6
2
8
.6
4
1
2
.8
5
4
.5
0
0
.5
0
6
5
.0
0
2
0
.5
0
0
0
1
0
S
in
g
a
p
o
re
0
.2
4
1
.0
7
1
1
0
8
.0
5
2
.8
2
2
4
3
.3
4
0
3
.0
0
5
.0
0
1
.0
0
7
8
.0
0
2
1
.6
0
1
0
0
0
S
o
u
th
K
o
re
a
0
.1
7
1
.2
1
1
7
6
.5
8
3
.6
4
5
5
3
.5
0
0
3
.0
0
4
.5
0
0
.4
7
6
2
.0
0
2
6
.8
0
0
0
1
0
T
a
iw
a
n
0
.2
6
0
.4
7
1
2
.4
8
1
,3
9
1
.1
9
1
2
.0
0
3
.0
0
0
.5
6
6
5
.0
0
2
2
.5
0
0
0
1
0
R
eg
io
n
a
l
A
v
er
a
g
e
0
.2
0
1
.0
6
1
9
3
.1
7
2
.9
7
5
5
2
.8
3
0
.6
7
2
.9
7
4
.3
3
0
.7
0
6
7
.1
7
2
2
.1
8
0
.5
0
0
0
.5
0
0
A
si
a
-
E
m
er
g
in
g
C
h
in
a
0
.1
3
0
.5
1
0
4
3
.6
7
2
.2
7
3
8
6
.6
8
0
2
.0
0
1
.0
0
0
.7
6
0
0
1
0
In
d
ia
0
.1
9
1
.2
3
0
5
0
.0
7
4
.6
2
8
4
.7
9
1
2
.0
0
5
.0
0
0
.5
8
5
7
.0
0
1
9
.1
0
1
0
0
0
In
d
o
n
es
ia
0
.1
6
0
.4
4
0
3
2
.7
3
4
.7
1
7
4
.3
2
0
2
.0
0
4
.0
0
0
.6
5
1
8
.3
0
0
1
0
0
M
a
la
y
si
a
0
.2
7
0
.6
6
0
1
0
0
.3
2
3
.0
0
9
2
.5
1
1
3
.0
0
5
.0
0
0
.9
5
7
6
.0
0
1
4
.8
0
1
0
0
0
P
h
il
ip
p
in
es
0
.1
5
0
.2
0
0
4
5
.0
0
3
.8
5
9
5
.8
9
1
1
.0
0
4
.0
0
0
.2
2
6
5
.0
0
8
.8
0
0
1
0
0
P
a
k
is
ta
n
0
.1
6
0
.9
1
0
3
0
.7
1
3
.1
7
2
1
1
.8
3
0
1
.0
0
4
.0
0
0
.4
1
1
7
.8
0
1
0
0
0
T
h
a
il
a
n
d
0
.1
7
0
.1
1
0
5
5
.6
3
3
.2
7
1
0
7
.3
2
1
2
.5
6
4
.0
0
0
.8
1
6
4
.0
0
1
8
.3
0
1
0
0
0
R
eg
io
n
a
l
A
v
er
a
g
e
0
.1
8
0
.5
8
0
5
1
.1
6
3
.5
6
1
5
0
.4
8
0
.5
7
1
.9
4
3
.8
6
0
.6
4
6
5
.5
0
1
6
.1
8
0
.5
7
0
.2
9
0
.1
4
0
A
u
st
ra
la
si
a
-
D
ev
el
o
p
ed
A
u
st
ra
li
a
0
.1
1
0
.8
3
1
9
7
.5
5
4
.5
8
1
8
7
.1
2
1
3
.0
0
4
.0
0
0
.7
6
7
5
.0
0
4
.8
0
1
0
0
0
N
ew
Z
ea
la
n
d
0
.1
3
1
.2
3
1
6
1
.1
3
2
.7
7
1
0
4
.9
2
1
4
.0
0
4
.0
0
0
.9
5
7
0
.0
0
1
0
0
0
R
eg
io
n
a
l
A
v
er
a
g
e
0
.1
2
1
.0
3
1
7
9
.3
4
3
.6
7
1
4
6
.0
2
1
3
.5
0
4
.0
0
0
.8
5
7
2
.5
0
4
.8
0
1
0
0
0
E
u
ro
p
e
-
D
ev
el
o
p
ed
A
u
st
ri
a
0
.1
6
0
.8
0
1
4
2
.9
5
2
.4
6
2
1
5
.4
6
1
3
.0
0
2
.5
0
0
.2
1
5
4
.0
0
2
8
.3
0
0
0
1
0
B
el
g
iu
m
0
.1
5
0
.4
5
1
6
2
.6
5
3
.0
4
2
5
5
.2
6
1
2
.0
0
3
.0
0
0
.5
4
6
1
.0
0
1
9
.5
0
0
1
0
0
D
en
m
a
rk
0
.1
3
1
.6
8
1
7
2
.3
3
2
.2
5
2
2
8
.2
3
1
3
.0
0
4
.0
0
0
.4
6
6
2
.0
0
1
6
.0
0
0
0
0
1
F
in
la
n
d
0
.1
7
0
.3
4
1
7
5
.1
6
2
.5
4
5
8
1
.8
9
1
1
.2
2
3
.5
0
0
.4
6
7
7
.0
0
1
2
.0
0
0
0
0
1
F
ra
n
ce
0
.1
4
0
.8
4
1
6
0
.7
0
2
.9
2
6
9
5
.8
3
1
0
.0
0
3
.5
0
0
.3
8
6
9
.0
0
1
3
.5
0
0
1
0
0
G
er
m
a
n
y
0
.1
5
0
.7
6
1
4
9
.4
5
2
.7
7
7
3
1
.4
1
1
3
.0
0
3
.5
0
0
.2
8
6
2
.0
0
2
1
.5
0
0
0
1
0
Ir
el
a
n
d
0
.1
3
0
.2
3
1
6
0
.1
7
3
.4
4
5
7
3
.2
6
1
1
.0
0
5
.0
0
0
.7
9
5
.1
0
1
0
0
0
It
a
ly
0
.2
4
1
.1
5
1
4
3
.5
5
2
.1
9
8
9
4
.8
3
1
2
.0
0
2
.0
0
0
.4
2
6
2
.0
0
2
4
.8
0
0
1
0
0
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
0
.1
7
0
.9
9
1
6
7
.1
4
2
.4
2
1
,4
6
5
.4
6
1
3
.0
0
2
.5
0
0
.2
0
6
4
.0
0
1
6
.5
0
0
1
0
0
N
o
rw
a
y
0
.1
8
0
.3
7
1
7
4
.7
3
3
.2
2
4
4
5
.4
2
1
2
.0
0
3
.5
0
0
.4
2
7
4
.0
0
5
.8
0
0
0
0
1
S
p
a
in
0
.2
4
1
.1
7
1
7
6
.9
5
2
.0
0
1
,4
6
4
.7
4
1
2
.0
0
5
.0
0
0
.3
7
6
4
.0
0
1
8
.6
0
0
1
0
0
S
w
ed
en
0
.1
8
0
.8
5
1
8
0
.6
3
3
.4
6
3
9
5
.9
1
1
1
.5
6
3
.5
0
0
.3
3
8
3
.0
0
6
.8
0
0
0
0
1
S
w
it
ze
rl
a
n
d
0
.1
4
1
.8
3
1
9
0
.4
8
2
.3
4
3
0
7
.7
8
1
1
.0
0
3
.0
0
0
.2
7
6
8
.0
0
2
2
.0
0
0
0
1
0
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
o
n
n
ex
t
p
a
g
e
47
T
a
b
le
5
{
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
R
eg
io
n
C
o
u
n
tr
y
R
2
F
E
R
C
D
E
V
M
K
T
IR
IS
K
D
V
O
L
S
H
O
R
T
C
R
A
D
A
S
A
C
C
T
E
M
S
U
K
F
R
G
E
S
C
U
.K
.
0
.1
3
1
.1
1
1
8
9
.5
0
2
.4
2
1
,3
7
7
.7
2
1
3
.9
0
5
.0
0
0
.9
5
7
8
.0
0
7
.0
0
1
0
0
0
R
eg
io
n
a
l
A
v
er
a
g
e
0
.1
6
0
.9
0
1
6
7
.6
0
2
.6
8
6
8
8
.0
9
1
2
.0
5
3
.5
4
0
.4
3
6
7
.5
4
1
5
.5
3
0
.1
4
0
.3
6
0
.2
1
0
.2
9
E
u
ro
p
e
-
E
m
er
g
in
g
C
ze
ch
R
ep
u
b
li
c
0
.0
9
0
2
5
.0
0
2
.2
5
1
0
4
.0
3
0
3
.0
0
4
.0
0
0
.3
3
0
0
1
0
G
re
ec
e
0
.2
7
0
.4
7
0
6
8
.2
8
2
.8
4
1
4
4
.4
5
0
1
.0
0
2
.0
0
0
.2
2
5
5
.0
0
2
8
.3
0
0
1
0
0
P
o
la
n
d
0
.1
4
0
.7
2
0
4
6
.3
6
3
.5
2
7
1
.9
3
1
1
.0
0
2
.0
0
0
.2
9
0
0
1
0
P
o
rt
u
g
a
l
0
.1
4
0
.2
4
0
4
1
.6
2
2
.9
8
3
2
6
.2
6
1
1
.0
0
2
.5
0
0
.4
4
3
6
.0
0
2
5
.1
0
0
1
0
0
T
u
rk
ey
0
.3
0
0
.4
8
0
3
8
.1
5
3
.4
8
2
6
7
.2
7
1
2
.0
0
3
.0
0
0
.4
3
5
1
.0
0
0
1
0
0
R
eg
io
n
a
l
A
v
er
a
g
e
0
.1
9
0
.4
8
0
4
3
.8
8
3
.0
1
1
8
2
.7
9
0
.6
0
1
.6
0
2
.7
0
0
.3
4
4
7
.3
3
2
6
.7
0
0
0
.6
0
0
.4
0
0
N
o
rt
h
A
m
er
ic
a
-
D
ev
el
o
p
ed
C
a
n
a
d
a
0
.1
1
0
.7
9
1
9
3
.9
0
5
.2
8
2
1
7
.2
6
1
1
.4
5
4
.0
0
0
.6
4
7
4
.0
0
5
.3
0
1
0
0
0
U
.S
.
0
.1
5
1
.6
0
1
7
8
.9
5
3
.7
9
1
,8
5
1
.1
8
1
1
.0
0
3
.0
0
0
.6
5
7
1
.0
0
2
.0
0
1
0
0
0
R
eg
io
n
a
l
A
v
er
a
g
e
0
.1
3
1
.2
0
1
8
6
.4
3
4
.5
4
1
,0
3
4
.2
2
1
1
.2
3
3
.5
0
0
.6
4
7
2
.5
0
3
.6
5
1
0
0
0
L
a
ti
n
A
m
er
ic
a
-
E
m
er
g
in
g
A
rg
en
ti
n
a
0
.2
1
0
.3
7
0
3
4
.9
4
2
.6
6
3
5
.9
4
1
1
.0
0
2
.0
0
0
.3
4
4
5
.0
0
0
1
0
0
B
ra
zi
l
0
.1
3
0
.0
8
0
3
8
.3
1
3
.4
7
7
2
4
.3
9
1
1
.0
0
5
.0
0
0
.2
7
5
4
.0
0
0
1
0
0
C
h
il
e
0
.1
5
0
.8
1
0
7
3
.1
3
1
.7
7
8
2
.6
8
1
2
.0
0
4
.0
0
0
.6
3
5
2
.0
0
0
1
0
0
M
ex
ic
o
0
.2
0
0
.8
8
0
2
9
.6
8
2
.1
8
3
5
9
.0
7
1
0
.0
0
3
.0
0
0
.1
7
6
0
.0
0
0
1
0
0
P
er
u
0
.1
0
0
.6
7
0
4
4
.8
0
2
.5
8
1
6
.5
7
0
0
.0
0
3
.5
0
0
.4
5
3
8
.0
0
0
1
0
0
R
eg
io
n
a
l
A
v
er
a
g
e
0
.1
6
0
.5
7
0
4
4
.1
7
2
.5
3
2
4
3
.7
3
0
.8
0
0
.8
0
3
.5
0
0
.3
7
4
9
.8
0
0
1
0
0
M
ea
n
0
.1
7
0
.8
2
0
.5
1
6
3
.2
7
3
.0
4
4
3
8
.8
5
0
.8
1
1
.9
9
3
.6
4
0
.5
2
6
2
.6
5
1
6
.0
2
0
.3
3
0
.3
7
0
.2
1
0
.0
9
S
td
.
d
ev
.
0
.0
5
3
.1
7
0
.5
1
2
3
.2
5
0
.7
7
4
5
1
.6
2
0
.4
0
1
.0
6
1
.0
3
0
.2
4
1
2
.4
9
7
.7
5
0
.4
7
0
.4
9
0
.4
1
0
.2
9
T
h
is
ta
b
le
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
co
u
n
tr
y
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
u
se
d
in
th
e
cr
o
ss
-c
o
u
n
tr
y
a
n
a
ly
si
s
o
f
th
e
a
ss
et
g
ro
w
th
e
ec
t.
T
h
e
co
u
n
tr
y
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
a
re
p
ro
x
ie
s
fo
r
m
a
rk
et
e
ci
en
cy
,
li
m
it
s
to
a
rb
it
ra
g
e,
in
v
es
to
r
p
ro
te
ct
io
n
,
a
n
d
a
cc
o
u
n
ti
n
g
q
u
a
li
ty
.
T
h
e
m
a
rk
et
e
ci
en
cy
p
ro
x
ie
s
in
cl
u
d
e
st
o
ck
re
tu
rn
sy
n
ch
ro
n
ic
it
y
R
2
,
fu
tu
re
ea
rn
in
g
s
re
sp
o
n
se
co
e
ci
en
t
F
E
R
C
,
th
e
d
ev
el
o
p
ed
-m
a
rk
et
in
d
ic
a
to
r
D
E
V
,
a
n
d
th
e
im
p
o
rt
a
n
ce
o
f
st
o
ck
m
a
rk
et
in
th
e
ec
o
n
o
m
y
M
K
T
.
T
h
e
li
m
it
s
to
a
rb
it
ra
g
e
p
ro
x
ie
s
in
cl
u
d
e
th
e
a
v
er
a
g
e
id
io
sy
n
cr
a
ti
c
st
o
ck
re
tu
rn
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
IR
IS
K
(i
n
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
p
o
in
ts
),
th
e
a
v
er
a
g
ed
a
n
n
u
a
l
d
o
ll
a
r
tr
a
d
in
g
v
o
lu
m
e
D
V
O
L
(i
n
m
il
li
o
n
s)
,
a
n
d
th
e
in
d
ic
a
to
r
fo
r
eq
u
it
y
sh
o
rt
-s
a
le
p
er
m
is
si
o
n
S
H
O
R
T
.
T
h
e
p
ro
x
ie
s
fo
r
in
v
es
to
r
p
ro
te
ct
io
n
a
n
d
a
cc
o
u
n
ti
n
g
q
u
a
li
ty
in
cl
u
d
e
th
e
cr
ed
it
o
r
ri
g
h
ts
in
d
ex
C
R
,
th
e
re
v
is
ed
a
n
ti
-d
ir
ec
to
r
ri
g
h
ts
in
d
ex
A
D
,
th
e
a
n
ti
-s
el
f-
d
ea
li
n
g
in
d
ex
A
S
,
th
e
a
cc
o
u
n
ti
n
g
st
a
n
d
a
rd
s
ra
n
k
in
g
A
C
C
T
,
th
e
ea
rn
in
g
s
m
a
n
a
g
em
en
t
sc
o
re
E
M
S
,
a
n
d
fo
u
r
le
g
a
l
o
ri
g
in
in
d
ic
a
to
rs
U
K
,
F
R
,
G
E
,
a
n
d
S
C
,
re
p
re
se
n
ti
n
g
E
n
g
li
sh
,
F
re
n
ch
,
G
er
m
a
n
,
a
n
d
S
ca
n
d
in
a
v
ia
n
le
g
a
l
o
ri
g
in
s
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
T
h
e
d
et
a
il
s
o
f
th
es
e
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
a
re
p
ro
v
id
ed
in
A
p
p
en
d
ix
A
.
W
e
re
p
o
rt
th
e
v
a
lu
es
o
f
th
es
e
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
fo
r
ea
ch
co
u
n
tr
y
a
n
d
th
ei
r
a
v
er
a
g
es
fo
r
d
i
er
en
t
re
g
io
n
s.
T
h
e
la
st
tw
o
ro
w
s
re
p
o
rt
th
e
m
ea
n
s
a
n
d
st
a
n
d
a
rd
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
s
o
f
th
es
e
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
a
cr
o
ss
a
ll
th
e
co
u
n
tr
ie
s.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
is
fr
o
m
J
u
ly
o
f
1
9
8
2
to
J
u
n
e
o
f
2
0
1
0
.
48
T
a
b
le
6
:
C
o
rr
el
a
ti
o
n
s
o
f
C
o
u
n
tr
y
C
h
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
R
2
F
E
R
C
D
E
V
M
K
T
IR
IS
K
D
V
O
L
S
H
O
R
T
C
R
A
D
A
S
A
C
C
T
E
M
S
U
K
F
R
G
E
S
C
R
2
1
.0
0
0
F
E
R
C
-0
.0
5
8
1
.0
0
0
(0
.1
1
5
)
D
E
V
-0
.0
9
6
0
.3
5
3
1
.0
0
0
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
M
K
T
-0
.0
2
9
0
.2
9
1
0
.5
0
3
1
.0
0
0
(0
.1
7
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
IR
IS
K
-0
.1
1
9
-0
.0
2
4
-0
.0
8
1
0
.0
5
0
1
.0
0
0
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.5
3
3
)
(0
.0
2
3
)
(0
.1
9
5
)
D
V
O
L
0
.0
1
3
0
.1
9
6
0
.3
0
5
0
.1
1
2
-0
.0
7
3
1
.0
0
0
(0
.7
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
4
6
)
S
H
O
R
T
-0
.0
3
0
0
.2
9
8
0
.3
3
2
0
.1
4
2
0
.0
8
1
0
.1
5
9
1
.0
0
0
(0
.4
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
2
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
C
R
0
.1
1
2
0
.3
0
1
0
.2
7
0
0
.3
8
4
-0
.0
6
8
-0
.0
0
2
0
.1
7
5
1
.0
0
0
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
9
9
)
(0
.9
5
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
A
D
-0
.1
0
2
0
.1
8
9
0
.2
2
6
0
.4
2
1
0
.1
5
3
0
.0
5
0
0
.2
9
4
0
.2
7
3
1
.0
0
0
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.1
2
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
A
S
-0
.0
9
0
0
.0
6
9
0
.2
3
3
0
.4
9
5
0
.1
2
3
0
.0
0
6
0
.0
8
9
0
.3
6
1
0
.5
3
6
1
.0
0
0
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
2
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.8
5
1
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
A
C
C
T
-0
.1
1
5
0
.2
9
9
0
.6
2
1
0
.5
6
3
0
.0
9
3
0
.1
5
5
0
.3
4
3
0
.3
0
1
0
.4
8
5
0
.4
9
1
1
.0
0
0
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
1
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
E
M
S
0
.3
2
4
-0
.0
3
0
-0
.1
1
0
-0
.2
4
1
-0
.3
2
7
-0
.1
1
7
-0
.3
8
8
0
.0
9
8
-0
.3
4
0
-0
.3
3
0
-0
.6
6
6
1
.0
0
0
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.3
9
6
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
1
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
U
K
-0
.1
1
5
0
.1
9
8
0
.1
4
2
0
.4
2
6
0
.3
1
4
0
.0
0
9
0
.1
7
0
0
.4
0
6
0
.5
5
9
0
.7
6
6
0
.4
6
3
-0
.4
4
1
1
.0
0
0
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.7
9
5
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
F
R
0
.0
7
0
-0
.4
1
9
-0
.3
9
0
-0
.3
9
7
-0
.1
7
2
-0
.0
2
0
-0
.1
8
4
-0
.5
0
8
-0
.4
0
7
-0
.4
9
2
-0
.6
5
3
0
.2
7
7
-0
.5
6
2
1
.0
0
0
(0
.0
4
4
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.5
5
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
G
E
0
.0
8
8
0
.2
7
3
0
.1
1
8
-0
.1
1
8
-0
.1
2
8
0
.0
3
9
-0
.1
0
2
0
.1
3
6
-0
.1
6
9
-0
.2
0
1
0
.0
2
8
0
.4
8
7
-0
.3
2
0
-0
.4
1
1
1
.0
0
0
(0
.0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.2
4
5
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.3
7
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
S
C
-0
.0
5
3
0
.0
3
7
0
.2
8
7
0
.1
2
6
-0
.0
4
0
-0
.0
3
1
0
.1
8
2
0
.0
3
3
0
.0
3
6
-0
.1
1
0
0
.3
2
8
-0
.2
9
3
-0
.2
0
4
-0
.2
6
2
-0
.1
4
9
1
.0
0
0
(0
.1
2
9
)
(0
.2
3
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.2
6
8
)
(0
.3
5
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.3
2
4
)
(0
.2
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
T
h
is
ta
b
le
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
c
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
s
a
m
o
n
g
th
e
c
o
u
n
tr
y
ch
a
ra
c
te
ri
st
ic
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s.
T
h
e
c
o
u
n
tr
y
ch
a
ra
c
te
ri
st
ic
s
a
re
p
ro
x
ie
s
fo
r
m
a
rk
e
t
e

c
ie
n
c
y
,
li
m
it
s
to
a
rb
it
ra
g
e
,
in
v
e
st
o
r
p
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
,
a
n
d
a
c
c
o
u
n
ti
n
g
q
u
a
li
ty
.
T
h
e
m
a
rk
e
t
e

c
ie
n
c
y
p
ro
x
ie
s
in
c
lu
d
e
st
o
ck
re
tu
rn
sy
n
ch
ro
n
ic
it
y
R
2
,
fu
tu
re
e
a
rn
in
g
s
re
sp
o
n
se
c
o
e

c
ie
n
t
F
E
R
C
,
th
e
d
e
v
e
lo
p
e
d
-m
a
rk
e
t
in
d
ic
a
to
r
D
E
V
,
a
n
d
th
e
im
p
o
rt
a
n
c
e
o
f
st
o
ck
m
a
rk
e
t
in
th
e
e
c
o
n
o
m
y
M
K
T
.
T
h
e
li
m
it
s
to
a
rb
it
ra
g
e
p
ro
x
ie
s
in
c
lu
d
e
th
e
a
v
e
ra
g
e
id
io
sy
n
c
ra
ti
c
st
o
ck
re
tu
rn
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
IR
IS
K
(i
n
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
p
o
in
ts
),
th
e
a
v
e
ra
g
e
d
a
n
n
u
a
l
d
o
ll
a
r
tr
a
d
in
g
v
o
lu
m
e
D
V
O
L
(i
n
m
il
li
o
n
s)
,
a
n
d
th
e
in
d
ic
a
to
r
fo
r
sh
o
rt
-s
a
le
p
e
rm
is
si
o
n
S
H
O
R
T
.
T
h
e
p
ro
x
ie
s
fo
r
in
v
e
st
o
r
p
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
a
n
d
a
c
c
o
u
n
ti
n
g
q
u
a
li
ty
in
c
lu
d
e
th
e
c
re
d
it
o
r
ri
g
h
ts
in
d
e
x
C
R
,
th
e
re
v
is
e
d
a
n
ti
-d
ir
e
c
to
r
ri
g
h
ts
in
d
e
x
A
D
,
th
e
a
n
ti
-s
e
lf
-d
e
a
li
n
g
in
d
e
x
A
S
,
th
e
a
c
c
o
u
n
ti
n
g
st
a
n
d
a
rd
s
ra
n
k
in
g
A
C
C
T
,
th
e
e
a
rn
in
g
s
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
sc
o
re
E
M
S
,
a
n
d
th
e
fo
u
r
le
g
a
l
o
ri
g
in
in
d
ic
a
to
rs
U
K
,
F
R
,
G
E
,
a
n
d
S
C
,
re
p
re
se
n
ti
n
g
E
n
g
li
sh
,
F
re
n
ch
,
G
e
rm
a
n
,
a
n
d
S
c
a
n
d
in
a
v
ia
n
le
g
a
l
o
ri
g
in
s,
re
sp
e
c
ti
v
e
ly
.
T
h
e
d
e
ta
il
s
o
f
th
e
se
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
a
re
p
ro
v
id
e
d
in
A
p
p
e
n
d
ix
A
.
T
h
e
p
-v
a
lu
e
s
fo
r
th
e
p
a
ir
w
is
e
c
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
s
a
re
re
p
o
rt
e
d
in
th
e
p
a
re
n
th
e
se
s.
49
Table 7: Cross-country Analysis: Market Eciency and the Asset Growth Eect
Panel A: SPREAD as dependent variable
Equal-weighted SPREAD Value-weighted SPREAD
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
R2 -0.305** -0.372** -0.329** -0.364***
(-2.146) (-2.465) (-2.116) (-2.992)
FERC 0.041** 0.031** 0.029 0.012
(2.124) (2.173) (1.526) (0.736)
DEV 0.043*** 0.032* 0.056*** 0.042*
(2.352) (1.863) (3.142) (1.703)
MKT 0.063** 0.038 0.097** 0.026
(2.415) (1.097) (2.368) (0.836)
Intercept 0.062** 0.003 0.010 -0.003 0.050 0.079** -0.005 -0.011 -0.047* 0.048
(2.416) (0.233) (0.733) (-0.101) (1.918) (2.339) (-0.282) (-0.637) (-1.686) (0.855)
R2 0.106 0.0981 0.174 0.127 0.283 0.098 0.042 0.182 0.113 0.273
Panel B: SLOPE as dependent variable
Equal-weighted SLOPE Value-weighted SLOPE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
R2 -0.472** -0.320* -0.405*** -0.430***
(-2.083) (-1.896) (-3.107) (-3.374)
FERC 0.052* 0.026* 0.026* 0.039
(1.942) (1.932) (1.768) (1.244)
DEV 0.043* 0.040* 0.035** 0.030**
(1.972) (1.813) (2.234) (2.047)
MKT 0.084* 0.027 0.016 0.022
(1.826) (1.048) (1.063) (0.595)
Intercept 0.054 -0.006 0.001 -0.028 -0.033 0.102 0.015 0.015 0.034 0.096**
(0.548) (-0.32) (0.034) (-1.150) (-0.201) (4.464) (0.968) (0.147) (1.083) (2.324)
R2 0.102 0.108 0.094 0.077 0.196 0.147 0.072 0.072 0.028 0.198
This table reports the results of the cross-country regressions which examine the relation between market eciency
and the asset growth eect. The dependent variables are the within-country time-series averages of the asset growth
eect measures, SPREAD and SLOPE, given in local currency. SPREAD is the equal-weighted or value-weighted
average of the annual return dierence between the bottom and top asset growth bucket portfolios, where their
returns are cumulated from July of year t to June of year t + 1. The value weighting of SPREAD is based on
rms' market capitalizations in June of year t. SLOPE is given by negative one times the time-series average of the
coecients, which are obtained by regressing buy-and-hold stock returns from July of year t to June of year t + 1
on the asset growth rates measured over year t   1. The regressions are either equal-weighted or value-weighted.
The value-weighted version of SLOPE is based on the weighted-least-squares regressions, where the weights are
proportional to market capitalizations in June of year t. Panel A reports the regression results where the equal- or
value-weighted SPREAD is used as the dependent variable. Panel B presents the regression results where the equal-
or value-weighted SLOPE is used as the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are market eciency proxies,
including stock return synchronicity R2, future earnings response coecient FREC, the developed-market indicator
DEV, and the importance of stock market MKT, which are explained in detail in Appendix A. The t-statistics
reported in parentheses are computed using robust standard errors. Statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Table 8: Cross-country Analysis: Market Eciency and the Asset Growth Eect, Controlling for
Firm Protiability
Panel A: SPREAD2 as dependent variable
Equal-weighted SPREAD2 Value-weighted SPREAD2
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
R2 -0.286*** -0.327** -0.225** -0.294**
(-2.894) (-2.170) (-2.239) (-2.056)
FERC 0.030** 0.035* 0.032** 0.026**
(2.296) (1.994) (2.480) (1.842)
DEV 0.027* 0.033* 0.022* 0.026*
(1.885) (1.732) (1.739) (1.860)
MKT 0.034* 0.023 0.037** 0.029
(1.910) (1.260) (2.258) (1.474)
Intercept 0.078*** 0.029 0.011 -0.002 0.071* 0.052** 0.073 0.013 0.006 0.138*
(4.367) (0.394) (0.964) (-0.077) (1.966) (2.301) (1.390) (1.042) (0.185) (1.799)
R2 0.123 0.106 0.088 0.069 0.219 0.107 0.092 0.086 0.104 0.203
Panel B: SLOPE2 as dependent variable
Equal-weighted SLOPE2 Value-weighted SLOPE2
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
R2 -0.476* -0.451** -0.444* -0.410*
(-1.901) (-2.119) (-1.853) (-1.793)
FERC 0.032** 0.026** 0.027* 0.025*
(2.288) (2.142) (1.896) (1.936)
DEV 0.034** 0.032* 0.030* 0.037*
(2.123) (1.797) (1.833) (1.773)
MKT 0.074*** 0.042 0.065** 0.058
(2.825) (0.889) (2.411) (0.824)
Intercept 0.098* 0.040 0.018 -0.027 0.024 0.126*** 0.143** 0.028 -0.074 0.045
(1.987) (1.053) (1.023) (-1.049) (0.364) (2.827) (2.133) (1.277) (-1.419) (0.619)
R2 0.091 0.101 0.097 0.113 0.203 0.114 0.132 0.103 0.125 0.204
This table reports the results of the cross-country regressions which examine the relation between market eciency
and the protability-controlled asset growth eect. The dependent variables are the within-country time-series
averages of the alternative asset growth eect measures, SPREAD2 and SLOPE2, which are given in local currency
and control for the eect of rm-level protability. Panel A reports the regressions results when the equal- or
value-weighted SREPAD2 is used as the dependent variable. In July of each year t, we sort stocks within each
country into terciles based on return on equity (ROE) and further divide each ROE group into quintiles based on
the asset growth rate (AG). We subsequently form ve AG portfolios by combining all the stocks that are ranked
into the same AG quintile but belong to the dierent ROE terciles. SPREAD2 is then given by the equal-weighted
or value-weighted average of the annual return dierence between the bottom and top AG portfolios formed in
this way, where their returns are cumulated from July of year t to June of year t + 1. The value weighting of
SPREAD2 is based on rms' market capitalizations in June of year t. Panel B presents the regressions results
when the equal- or value-weighted SLOPE2 is used as the dependent variable. SLOPE2 is given by negative one
times the time-series average of the coecients, which are obtained by regressing buy-and-hold stock returns from
July of year t to June of year t + 1 on both AG and ROE measured over year t   1. The regressions are either
equal-weighted or value-weighted. The value-weighted version of SLOPE2 is based on the weighted-least-squares
regressions, where the weights are proportional to rms' market capitalizations in June of year t. The explanatory
variables are market eciency proxies, including stock return synchronicity R2, future earnings response coecient
FREC, the developed-market indicator DEV, and the importance of stock market MKT, which are explained in
detail in Appendix A. These variables are explained in detail in Appendix A. The t-statistics reported in parentheses
are computed using robust standard errors. Statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by
***, **, and *, respectively.
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Table 9: Cross-country Analysis: Limits-to-Arbitrage and the Asset Growth Eect
Panel A: SPREAD as dependent variable
Equal-weighted SPREAD Value-weighted SPREAD
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
IRISK 0.018* 0.022** 0.027* 0.037**
(1.896) (2.018) (1.964) (2.209)
DVOL 0.009 0.023 -0.003 0.023
(0.464) (1.430) (-0.074) (0.735)
SHORT -0.008 -0.007 0.034 0.026
(-0.454) (-0.339) (1.413) (0.831)
Intercept -0.051 0.018 0.031** -0.073** -0.078* 0.011 -0.031 -0.168**
(-1.560) (1.383) (2.026) (-2.058) (-1.747) (0.725) (-0.526) (-2.307)
R2 0.100 0.008 0.010 0.175 0.112 0.002 0.032 0.126
Panel B: SLOPE as dependent variable
Equal-weighted SLOPE Value-weighted SLOPE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
IRISK 0.014 0.027 0.025 0.022
(1.453) (1.290) (1.133) (0.924)
DVOL -0.004 0.007 0.013 0.026
(-0.237) (0.233) (0.148) (0.389)
SHORT -0.009 -0.025 -0.035 -0.081
(-0.129) (-0.330) (-0.726) (-0.972)
Intercept 0.015 0.015 0.021 -0.053 -0.034 0.020 0.046 -0.028
(0.336) (0.577) (0.292) (-0.393) (0.765) (0.682) (0.853) (-0.334)
R2 0.011 0.002 0.003 0.064 0.014 0.004 0.008 0.051
This table reports the results of the cross-country regressions which examine the relation between
limits to arbitrage and the asset growth eect. The dependent variables are the within-country time-
series averages of the asset growth eect measures, SPREAD and SLOPE, given in local currency.
SPREAD is the equal-weighted or value-weighted average of the annual return dierence between the
bottom and top asset growth bucket portfolios, where their returns are cumulated from July of year
t to June of year t+1. The value weighting of SPREAD is based on rms' market capitalizations in
June of year t. SLOPE is given by negative one times the time-series average of the coecients, which
are obtained by regressing buy-and-hold stock returns from July of year t to June of year t + 1 on
the asset growth rates measured over year t  1. The regressions are either equal-weighted or value-
weighted. The value-weighted version of SLOPE is based on the weighted-least-squares regressions,
where the weights are proportional to rms' market capitalizations in June of year t. Panel A
reports the regression results where the equal- or value-weighted SPREAD is used as the dependent
variable. Panel B presents the regression results where the equal- or value-weighted SLOPE is used
as the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are the limits to arbitrage proxies, including
idiosyncratic stock return volatility IRISK, dollar trading volume DVOL, and permission for equity
short-sale SHORT, dened in Appendix A. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are computed
using robust standard errors. Statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by
***, **, and *, respectively.
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Table 11: Cross-country Analysis: Optimal Investment Eect vs. Mispricing-based Eect
Panel A: SPREAD as dependent variable: R2 against alternatives
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
R2 -0.286* -0.333* -0.304* -0.285* -0.251 -0.254* -0.339** -0.314 -0.222*
(-1.864) (-1.946) (-1.949) (-1.778) (-1.646) (-1.770) (-2.079) (-1.638) (-1.716)
IRISK 0.018*
(1.797)
DVOL 0.014
(0.863)
SHORT 0.004
(0.201)
CR 0.004
(0.464)
AD -0.000
(-0.022)
AS -0.016
(-0.559)
ACCT 0.001
(0.766)
EMS -0.002
(-1.111)
UK 0.060*
(1.857)
FR 0.045
(1.569)
GE 0.053
(1.608)
SC 0.103***
(3.297)
Intercept 0.080** 0.098*** 0.066* 0.045 0.063* 0.071** 0.030 0.112***
(2.234) (4.124) (1.933) (1.392) (1.761) (2.251) (0.421) (3.605)
R2 0.162 0.203 0.088 0.024 0.058 0.063 0.141 0.227 0.237
Panel B: SPREAD as dependent variable: FERC against alternatives
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
FERC 0.042** 0.029* 0.029** 0.034* 0.033* 0.030* 0.025* 0.023 * 0.022
(2.270) (1.788) (2.208) (1.780) (1.772) (1.802) (1.742) (1.786) (1.563)
IRISK 0.025*
(1.765)
DVOL 0.005
(0.262)
SHORT -0.030*
(-1.906)
CR 0.004
(0.516)
AD 0.003
(0.484)
AS 0.002
(0.060)
ACCT 0.001*
(1.745)
EMS -0.001
(-1.209)
UK 0.013
(0.804)
FR -0.005
(-0.272)
GE 0.007
(0.240)
SC 0.037*
(1.981)
Intercept -0.091** -0.003 0.025* -0.008 -0.008 0.003 -0.080 0.032**
(-2.541) (-0.184) (1.689) (-0.360) (-0.243) (0.117) (-1.514) (2.137)
R2 0.163 0.087 0.134 0.103 0.083 0.078 0.171 0.128 0.322
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Panel C: SPREAD as dependent variable: DEV against alternatives
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
DEV 0.042*** 0.030* 0.045** 0.033 0.033** 0.034** 0.047** 0.031* 0.034**
(2.77) (1.868) (2.505) (1.608) (2.216) (2.243) (2.557) (1.977) (2.095)
IRISK 0.024
(1.540)
DVOL -0.003
(-0.163)
SHORT -0.029
(-1.351)
CR 0.000
(0.033)
AD -0.004
(-0.407)
AS -0.023
(-0.809)
ACCT -0.000
(-0.471)
EMS -0.001
(-0.768)
UK 0.005
(0.273)
FR -0.007
(-0.480)
GE 0.001
(0.043)
SC 0.032
(1.326)
Intercept -0.079** 0.009 0.025 0.004 0.022 0.021 0.028 0.025
(-2.582) (0.671) (1.562) (0.220) (0.592) (0.937) (0.473) (1.616)
R2 0.146 0.082 0.165 0.067 0.098 0.104 0.170 0.165 0.272
Panel D: SPREAD as dependent variable: MKT against alternatives
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
MKT 0.064** 0.055** 0.074*** 0.049 0.075*** 0.076*** 0.069*** 0.064*** 0.056**
(2.490) (3.605) (3.163) (1.443) (3.645) (3.545) (2.952) (3.184) (2.518)
IRISK 0.018
(1.462)
DVOL 0.015
(0.867)
SHORT -0.013
(-0.845)
CR -0.001
(-0.085)
AD -0.010
(-1.270)
AS -0.039
(-1.591)
ACCT -0.001
(-0.037)
EMS -0.001
(-0.420)
UK -0.025
(-1.102)
FR -0.026
(-1.199)
GE 0.004
(0.145)
SC -0.001
(-0.005)
Intercept -0.019 -0.024 -0.022 -0.014 0.005 -0.013 -0.029 -0.101
(-0.713) (-0.227) (-1.059) (-0.451) (0.128) (-0.500) (-0.496) (-0.484)
R2 0.215 0.058 0.158 0.039 0.155 0.148 0.145 0.232 0.360
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Panel E: SLOPE as dependent variable: R2 against alternatives
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
R2 -0.420* -0.550*** -0.398* -0.305* -0.377 -0.389 -0.482* -0.725* -0.389*
(-1.965) (-3.229) (-1.727) (-1.723) (-1.488) (-1.522) (-1.834) (-1.977) (-1.777)
IRISK 0.012
(0.756)
DVOL 0.001
(0.033)
SHORT 0.002
(0.057)
CR 0.012
(0.729)
AD 0.003
(0.253)
AS -0.012
(-0.285)
ACCT 0.001
(1.218)
EMS 0.001
(0.323)
UK 0.074
(1.551)
FR 0.078
(1.640)
GE 0.055
(1.056)
SC 0.138***
(2.868)
Intercept 0.035* 0.142*** 0.077 0.039 0.063 0.084 0.054 0.148**
(0.063) (3.899) (1.385) (0.491) (0.930) (1.545) (0.827) (2.395)
R2 0.125 0.205 0.064 0.019 0.062 0.062 0.134 0.196 0.142
Panel F: SLOPE as dependent variable: FERC against alternatives
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
FERC 0.043* 0.040* 0.042** 0.038 * 0.045** 0.048** 0.045** 0.046** 0.039*
(1.915) (1.789) (2.444) (1.735) (2.429) (2.334) (2.069) (2.199) (1.724)
IRISK 0.021
(1.550)
DVOL -0.019
(-0.477)
SHORT -0.037
(-1.470)
CR -0.001
(-0.030)
AD 0.001
(0.125)
AS -0.007
(-0.156)
ACCT 0.001
(0.547)
EMS -0.001
(-0.216)
UK -0.008
(-0.272)
FR -0.011
(-0.488)
GE -0.017
(-0.252)
SC 0.027
(1.064)
Intercept -0.079 0.010 0.019 0.021 -0.012 -0.004 -0.041 0.006
(-1.442) (0.420) (0.949) (0.524) (-0.232) (-0.126) (-0.695) (0.241)
R2 0.117 0.039 0.125 0.027 0.091 0.091 0.108 0.103 0.229
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Panel G: SLOPE as dependent variable: DEV against alternatives
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
DEV 0.043* 0.054** 0.061** 0.059* 0.050** 0.050** 0.073** 0.045 0.046*
(1.847) (2.127) (2.347) (1.826) (2.383) (2.307) (2.196) (1.415) (2.019)
IRISK 0.021
(1.273)
DVOL -0.033
(-0.852)
SHORT -0.034
(-1.025)
CR 0.006
(0.389)
AD 0.000
(0.028)
AS -0.004
(-0.121)
ACCT -0.001
(-0.871)
EMS 0.000
(0.204)
UK 0.003
(0.170)
FR -0.001
(-0.007)
GE -0.001
(-0.019)
SC 0.018
(0.495)
Intercept -0.074 0.006 0.023 -0.003 -0.010 0.003 0.040 0.005
(-1.282) (0.365) (0.862) (-0.056) (-0.010) (0.115) (0.890) (0.143)
R2 0.088 0.154 0.143 0.051 0.114 0.115 0.183 0.083 0.209
Panel H: SLOPE as dependent variable: MKT against alternatives
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
MKT 0.046* 0.062* 0.072** 0.068* 0.081*** 0.076** 0.068** 0.056* 0.067**
(1.776) (1.987) (2.542) (1.892) (3.019) (2.699) (2.285) (1.850) (2.289)
IRISK 0.012
(0.863)
DVOL 0.018
(1.142)
SHORT -0.006
(-0.240)
CR 0.004
(0.315)
AD -0.010
(-1.136)
AS -0.020
(-0.642)
ACCT 0.000
(0.289)
EMS 0.001
(0.719)
UK -0.034
(-1.184)
FR -0.033
(-1.270)
GE -0.005
(-0.125)
SC 0.005
(0.133)
Intercept -0.059 -0.029 -0.023 -0.021 0.002 -0.022 -0.036 -0.018
(-1.070) (-0.901) (-0.693) (-0.263) (0.047) (-0.776) (-0.856) (-0.448)
R2 0.057 0.097 0.118 0.037 0.145 0.123 0.131 0.111 0.342
This table reports the results of cross-country regressions that examine the eect of market eciency jointly with the eect of limits
to arbitrage and the eect of investor protection and accounting quality. The dependent variables are the within-country time-series
averages of the asset growth eect measures, SPREAD and SLOPE, given in local currency. SPREAD is the equal-weighted average of
the annual return dierence between the bottom and top asset growth bucket portfolios, where their returns are cumulated from July
of year t to June of year t + 1. SLOPE is given by negative one times the time-series average of the coecients, which are obtained by
regressing buy-and-hold stock returns from July of year t to June of year t + 1 on the asset growth rates measured over year t   1. In
each regression, the explanatory variables include one of the four market eciency proxies (R2, FERC, DEV, and MKT) and a proxy for
either limits to arbitrage (IRISK, DVOL, and SHORT) or investor protection and accounting quality (CR, AD, AS, ACCT, EMS, and
four legal origin indicators). The legal origin indicators are always included jointly. These country characteristics are explained in detaile
in Appendix A. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are computed using robust standard errors. Statistical signicance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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